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PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY
COMMITMENT, GUARDIANSHIP, AND ALTERNATIVES
JOHN J. REGAN*
Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage, against the dying of the light.'
INTRODUCTION
Simone de Beauvoir, in her treatise on old age called La Veillesee,
concludes that "the manner in which a society behaves with its old
people unequivocally reveals the truth-often carefully masked-of its
principles and its ends." 2 This article will examine the legal aspects of
the .behavior of the American society with its elderly who can no
longer function as self-reliant individuals.
The number of aged in America. is growing dramatically From
three million or four percent of the population in 1900, the elderly,
defined as those 65 years of age and older, now number twenty mil-
lion, or ten percent of the population.3 The limits of human aging have
not expanded, but people are living more often into the oldest ages
as a result of prevention of death in early ages or in maturity 4 Thus,
at present one-half of the aged population is 73 years of age or older,
and one million persons (six percent of the elderly) are 85 or older,
a number expected to double by 1985
*B.A., Mary Immaculate College, 1951; J.D., Columbia Umversity, 1960; M.A, St.
John's University, 1963; LL.M., Columbia University, 1971. Associate Professor of
Law, University of Maryland. This article was submitted m partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law,
Columbia University
1. D. THOMAS, TmE CoLLEcDr POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 128 (1957).
2. S. DE BEAUVOIR, LA VLussE, as quoted n Lottman, rve Been Reading, CoLUm. F
31, 33 (Fall 1970).
3. SpEcIAL CoMM. Ox AGING oF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, DEvELoPMENTs IN AGING
1969, S. RE'. No. 91-875, 91st Cong, 2d Sess. 325 (1970) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOP-
MENTS IN AGING 19691.
4. DEPARTmENT oF HEALTi, EDUCATION AND WELARE, WoRKING wrH OLDER PEoPLE,
VOL. ll-BIoI.OGicAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SocIoLOGICAr ASPECTS OF AGING (1970) [here-
inafter cited as WoRKING wrm OimER PEoPLa, VoL. II]; GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF PsYcHIATRY, REPORT No. 59, PsYcHIATRY AND TE AGm: Ax INTRODUCTORY APPROACH
538 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GRouP FOR THE ADVANCFEMNT OF PsYCHIATRY, REPORT
No. 591.
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The significance of these statistics liesin-the correlation among-age,
health, and functional capacity As the number of elderly, particularly
of the older elderly, increases, the incidence of chronic disease, long-
term illness, and disability, which are the characteristic health prob-
lems of the elderly also increases, along with their dependence on
others.
The vulnerability and dependency of the elderly have stimulated a
substantial amount of federal financial assistance for the aged. In fiscal
1970, for example, the Social Security Administration spent a total of
$27 41 billion for insurance payments,5 funds which were derived largely
from federal trust funds. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare spent an additional $3.7 billion on programs for the aged,'
while the Administration on Aging received $28,360,000 for programs
under the Older Americans Act.7
The common law and the American legal system have developed a
different type of assistance for the problems of the dependent elderly.
This article will describe and evaluate from a legal perspective the
methods and procedures for providing this assistance, which shall be
denominated "protective services."
HISTORY OF LEGAL INTERVENTION
English law began to formalize assistance for the elderly with the
enactment of the statute de Praerogativa regis sometime between 1255
and 1290. s This statute dealt with the mentally ill, classified as idiots
(those who were born with "no understanding") and lunatics (who
had been born with understanding but had "lost the use of reason")
It granted the king custody of the person and lands of such persons,
and made him responsible for maintaining the ward and his household
out of the proceeds from the lands. The profits from managing the
land of the "natural fool" accrued to the king during the ward's life-
time, while those from lunatic's land had to be returned to him when
he came "to right mind." The land of the fool was to be returned to
his "right heirs" after his death.
The procedure for determining an individual's mental status called
5. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AJn WELFARE, ACTIVITIES SERVING OLmER
AMERICANS (1970).
6. Id.
7. DEvELOPMENTs IN AGING 1969, supra note 3, at 137
8. AMEICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 7 (Lmdman
& McIntyre eds. 1961) [hereinafter cited as ABF].
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for the Chancellor, upon petition, to issue a writ de idiota rnqutrendo,
which would be tried by a jury of twelve men.9 If the person was
found to be a lunatic, the Chancellor would commit him to the care
of some friend, who would receive an allowance to provide for him.
The incompetent's heir was generally made the manager of the estate
but not of the person (to prevent "sinister practices"), and was re-
sponsible for the estate to the court of chancery, the recovered lunatic,
or his administrator, according to a gradually developed set of customs,
rules, and standards.
The nearest relatives of the incompetent played a key role.10 They
cared for him during the period between the attack of lunacy and the
determination by the jury Formal proceedings, however, were Initiated
only if the incompetent had sufficient assets to bear the expense of the
inquiry, since the purpose was to assure the proper administration of
the incompetent's affairs. No proceedings were necessary for a poor
person, nor was there any method for compensating the nearest rela-
tives for their support.
Thus, the only type of protection provided for the elderly by early
English law was a guardianship for those who were mentally disabled
but wealthy The rest of the aged were left to their own or their
family's resources.
In early Colonial America the same pattern existed."' Those persons
lacking both assets and family joined with the itinerant poor to form
transient bands drifting from town to town. The Puritan ethic of the
period equated work with industry and produced laws aimed at com-
pelling the labor of these itmnerants rather than providing for their
needs. The mentally disabled and the elderly who could not work
wandered aimlessly about the countryside eking out an existence by
begging.
The mentally ill who became violent, however, began to attract
special attention. If one were deemed "too dangerous to be permitted
to be at large," the law, in what was to become the civil commitment
process, authorized his confinement for the duration of his dangerous
qondition.12 In the company of the criminal and the pauper he would
be sent to a public jail, workhouse, poorhouse or toa private pen, cage,
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 218.
11. Id. at 9.
12. A. DETScn, THE MErNm.LY ILL i ApmucA 419 (2d ed. 1949) [heremafter
•ated as DTsrrScH].
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or strongroom.'3 These institutions multiplied during the second quar-
ter of the eighteenth century as population centered in the towns.14
A movement toward separate treatment of the mentally disabled
began to develop in the second half of the eighteenth century In re-
sponse to a petition drawn by Benjamin Franklin, the Pennsylvania
Assembly m 1751 authorized the establishment of a mental hospital,
but it was not until 1773 that Virginia erected at Williamsburg the first
hospital devoted exclusively to the care of the mentally disabled. 15
Another half-century was to pass before a second hospital, the Eastern
Lunatic Asylum, was established m 1824 at Lexington, Kentucky
As might be expected, the problem of proper commitment pro-
cedures did not arise until such institutions were fully developed and
began to open their doors to the less obvious cases of mental disability 16
These procedures were frighteningly simple, in striking contrast to
those employed to preserve an incompetent's property As Deutsch
notes:
All that was necessary was for a relative, a friend-or, perhaps, an
enemy-to apply to one of the managers or physicians for an order
of admission. A few words hastily scribbled on a chance piece of
paper (such as "Jas Sproul is a proper person for the Pennsyl-
vania Hospital"), and signed by one of the physicians, and the
deed was done. 17
Yet to declare the same person incompetent for the purpose of the-
adimmstration of his affairs required a request for a writ, adequate
notice, jury trial, and appointment of a guardian.' 8
As the number of state hospitals increased during the 1830's and
1840's, the need for legislation defimng commitment procedures be-
came clear.19 Public attention to the problem was excited by the case
of Josiah Oakes.20 An elderly and ordinarily prudent man, Oakes had'
become engaged to young woman of unsavory character a few days
after the death of his wife. He was committed by his family to the-
13. Id. at 420.
14. Id. at 51. See Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerouness: Some Fictions about-
Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 24, 40 (1970).
15. id. at 59, 71.
16. ABF, supra note 8, at i0.
17. DEUtrscH, supra note 12, at 62.
18. ABF, supra note 8, at 11-12.
19. DEuTscH, supra note 12, at 422.
20. Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (1845-46).
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Massachusetts asylum on the allegation that he suffered from halluci-
nations and displayed unsoundness of mind in conducting hIs business
affairs. In ordering Oakes' release after hearing his habeas corpus peti-
tion, the Massachusetts court laid down guidelines for detention of
the mentally ill:
The right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is found in
that great law of humanity, which makes it necessary to confine
those whose going at large would be dangerous to themselves or
others. And the necessity which creates the law, creates the
limitation of the law The question must then arise in each partic-
ular case whether a patient's own safety, or that of others, requires
that he should be restrained for a certain time, and whether re-
straint is necessary for his restoration, or will be conducive thereto.
The restraint can continue as long as the necessity continues.
This is the limitation, and the proper limitation.21
The court, it should be noted, adopted a broad view of the ".danger-
ousness" criterion, which included those considered dangerous to them-
selves as well as to others.
The forces of medicine and social work combined to produce a
widespread and popularly supported movement to aid the mentally dis-
abled during the second half of the nineteenth century 22 Dr. Benjamin.
Rush, the father of American psychiatry, and Dr. Isaac Ray, the author
of an authoritative work relating law and psychiatry, led the advance
of medical science. Mrs. E.W.P Packard and Miss Dorothea Dix cru-
saded for changes in the treatment of the mentally ill. The result was
a stream of new and revised legislation in the states, which constitutes
the basic legislative patterns currently in force.
Thus 700 years of legal evolution have produced the two basic
protective procedures for assisting the elderly who were mentally dis-
abled: civil commitment and guardianship. These protective services
will now be examined in detail.
CIVIL COMMITMENT
Though representing only 10 percent of the population, the aged
make up about 30 percent of the patients in mental hospitals.2 About
"21. )d. at 125.
22. ABF, supra note 8, at 12-13.
23. DEVELOPMENTS iNAGING 1969, suipra note 3, at 250.
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18 to 30 percent of the first admissions to these hospitals are aged-per-
sons. 4 In nursing homes an estimated 55 to 80 percent of the r1esi-
dents are mentally impaired.2 Even among those aged still living in the
community, various studies indicate that from 10 to 25 percent have
some degree of mental disability 26
Of greater iportance is the fact that the percentage of mental
hospital first admissions of elderly persons is increasing more rapidly
than the total population of the aged.27 This change has been attributed
not only to the greater longevity of the population with its con-
comitant increase in symptoms of chronic brain syndrome, but to the
accelerating pressures of urbanization and technologic change.
These pressures are altering cultural value orientations, with pro-
ductivity increasingly becoming a measure of worth, with respect
for tradition and for the past diminishing, and with family life
becoming more individualistic and increasingly typified by the
two-generation mobile nuclear family The aged in our society
are becoming increasingly more alienated, more isolated, less
valued and on each count more vulnerable to mental illness.28
This article contends that the present system which authorizes the
commitment of mentally ill aged persons to mental hospitals needs
major reform, and in particular:
1. The process for determining which aged persons are mentally
ill is defective, both in the criteria used and the procedures em-
ployed, for making this determination;
2. the process of treating those aged persons found to be mentally
ill at state mental hospitals is inadequate;
3. the process for determining the type of institution which can
best care for these persons fails to provide sufficient alternatives
to state mental hospitals.
24. GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 59, supra note 4, at
542.
25. Id., DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING 1969, supra note 3, at 250.
26. DEVELOPMENTs IN AGING 1969, supra note 3, at 250.
27. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, DEVELOPmENTS IN AGING





The state has traditionally justified its intervention in the lives of the
aged by pointing to its police power and its role as parens patrae.29
By vixrtue of the former, the state has the inherent power to protect
itself and its citizens against breaches of the peace, and thus the focus
is on the interests of society. Under the latter the state has the right
and duty to protect the persons and property of those unable to care
for themselves because of minority or mental illness, and therefore the
interests of the individual are supposedly paramount. 0
The Critena
The binge upon which both state powers turn is the alleged mental
illness of the elderly person. In theory, a hospitalization proceeding
requires a two-level determination about the existence of mental ill-
ness: (1) the patient is mentally ill from a medical viewpoint, and
(2) his illness is such as to satisfy the legal criterion or test.3'
The Public Health Draft Act for the Commitment of the Mentally
Ill is a typical example of state statutes.32 It provides that a person may
be committed if he
(1) is mentally ill, and (2) because of Is illness is likely to injure
himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or (3) is in need
of custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital and, because
of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsi-
ble decisions with respect to his hospitalization. 83
Mental illness, however, is an extremely elusive medical concept. The
Draft Act, for example, defines a mentally ill individual as one "having
a psychatnc or other disease which substantially impairs his mental
health." 34 The circularity of such a definition is~not calculated to in-
still confidence in decisions based on it. An American Bar Foundation
29. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH.
L. Rav. 945, 955 (1959); Taylor, A Critical Look into the Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment Procedure, 10 WAsHBuRN LJ. 237, 239 (1971).
30. Ross, supra note 29, at 956-57
31. Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1960).
32. National Institute of Mental Health, Draft Act for the Commitment of the
Mentally Ill (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1952), m ABF, supra note 8, at 397
33. Id. § (9) (g).
34. Id. at 400.
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report noted a similar vagueness and begging of the question in many
state statutes:
The statutes take one of two approaches: (1) to define mental
illness solely in terms of the arributes of an ill person; or (2) to
define mental illness not only in terms of such illness but also in
terms of the therapeutic consequences for which his condition is
an appropriate predicate. 35
The difficulty is caused by the nature and breadth of mental illness.
Many mental disorders, including those of the aged, are wholly func-
tional in nature and involve no organic pathology 3 The concept is
extremely broad, ranging "from the massive functional inhibition char-
acteristic of one form of catatonic schizophrenia to those seermngly
slight aberrancies associated with an emotionally unstable personality,
but which are so close to conduct in which we all engage as to define
the entire continuum involved."13 7
The same range of coverage is found in attempts to describe mental
illness caused by old age. The biological characteristics of senescence"
are accompanied by a progressive loss of mental resources.39 Energy
decreases, responsiveness declines, initiative and creative imagination
wane, egocentricity increases, and a certain warping of personality oc-
curs. Physical and mental limitations arouse feelings of helplessness,
35. R. RocK,_HoSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 69-70 (1968).
36. Weihifen, supra note 31, at 4.
37. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DisoRDERs (2d ed. 1968), as quoted m Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On
the justiftcations for Civil Conntmment, 117 U. PA. L.-REv. 75, 80 (1968) [hereinafter
cited. as Livermore]. One study of commitment proceedings found that agreement
among exanming physicians as to the proper diagnosis in a given case was very poor.
Complete consensus was reached in one case out of five, while total disagreement
marked almost three cases out of ten. The Language of Involuntary Mental Hospitaliza-
tion: A Study in Sound and Fury, 4 U. MicH. J. OF L. REFORM 195 (1971).
38. Aging is defined as the sum total of changes that occur m an individual with
the passage -of- tune from birth throughout the course of life, which are not attributable
to. accident or disease. Senescence, a more specific term, refers to inborn and in-
evitable degenerative changes that occur after maturity has been reached, which ulti-
mately culminate in death. WORKING wiTH OLDER PEOPLE, VOL. II, supra note 4, at 2.
See also Busse, Theories of Aging, in BEHAVIOR AND ADAPTATION IN LATE Lnm 12 (Busse
& Pfeiffer eds. 1969).
39. P. NOYES & L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 244 (6th ed. 1962). See also
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL DISORDERS OF THE AGING, PUBLIC
HF-ALTH SERVICE PuB. No. 933 (1968); Dovenmuehle, Geriatric Psychiatry, 27 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 133 (1962).
[Vol. 13.569
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loss of friends and relatives and perhaps rejection by children generate
loneliness, and these in turn lead to anxiety, hostility, and a tendency
toward isolation. These mental changes may range from the usual mild
senescence of old age to the extreme impoverishment of senile de-
mentia. The transition is ordinarily gradual, and the dividing line may
be a matter of opinion.
Persons whose mental disorders become significant in old age may
be considered in two groups: "(1) those who have disorders of affect
or content in the absence of brain damage; and (2) those who have
disorders in the presence of brain damage as reflected by brain syn-
drome." 40 A third group, persons who have grown old in hospitals
or who have long-term chronic mental disorders that began before
chronological old age, will not be discussed.
The first group consists of those with endogenous psychoses and
the disorders of content (thinking) that are revealed, or appear to
develop, in later life.41 Their mental disorders may have begun in
youth, but they have escaped long-term hospitalization owing to better
general health, economic resources, family protection, and special skills,
or because the symptoms failed to stimulate community action.42
The largest group of aged with mental disorders who are institu-
tionalized is the "organic" group. This group is composed of (1) per-
sons with relatively uncomplicated brain syndrome and (2) persons
with disorders in which the brain damage is accompanied by disorders
of affect or content. 43 Organic brain syndrome is defined as the "basic
mental condition characteristically resulting from diffuse 'impairment
of brain tissue function from whatever cause." 44 A temporary syn-
drome is called acute, and the underlying brain damage is assumed
to be reversible. 45 The syndrome is termed chronic when it is.perma-
nent, and the underlying brain damage is considered irreversible. Both
conditions may coexist in an aged person, and both may produce dis-
orders characterized by impairment of orientation, memory, and in-
40. GRoup FOR THE ADVANC EMENT OF PSYCHATRY, REPORT No. 59, supra note 4, at
545.
41. Id. at 546.
42. Id. at 547..
43. Id. at 549.
44. Wang, Orgamn Brain Syndromes, in BEHAVIOR AND ADAPTAonToiN LAT' LtiFE 263:
<Busse & Pfeiffer eds. 1969).
45. Id. at 267
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tellectual functions.4 6 Judgment and ability of emotion are also usually
affected.
Good diagnostic procedure avoids the use of the patient's age as a
determining criterion of predominant pathology 47 Senile brain de-
terioration should not be considered a normal concomitant of the
passage of tme,48 nor should the organic factor be overemphasized to
the neglect of environmental factors and the patient's underlying per-
sonality 49 Geriatric psychiatry is now starting to place more emphasis
on seeking mixed causes of mental illness in older persons, taking into
consideration possible interactions among physical, mental, and social
illnesses.
The standard procedure for diagnosing the behavioral manifestations
of the cerebral status is the climcal neuro-psychiatric examination. 0 In
cases of relatively severe brain damage, the primary characteristics of
organic brain syndrome are easily recognmzed, but in patients with only
46. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 59, supra note 4, at 550.
47. Id. at 551. The following criteria have been developed to assist in the diagnosis
and classification of brain syndrome:
1. Disorientation for time, place or person.
2. Evidence of impaired immediate recall.
3. Deficits [sic] of recent and remote memory
4. Weakening of intellectual functions as indicated by difficulty and
errors in doing simple calculations or in recalling simple items of general
information.
5. Defects of grasp and orientation. These defects may be discernible as
difficulty in retaining, and reacting to, questions or commands. They
may also be identified through faulty reaction to the situation of the
interpersonal transaction, revealing that it is not understood. This can
be briefly called situational disorientation.
6. A reliable history, from the patient or other sources, of episodes, mter-
mittent or persistent, of occurrences of the above.
The first four factors should all be present for a diagnosis of chrome brain syndrome,
,although some may be less obvious or severe than others. The presence of only one
or several of the signs is good reason to suspect developing brain syndrome. The
diagnosis may be supported by other clues, such as emotional liability, focal neurological
signs, slovenliness or poor habits, poor judgment not related clearly to emotional
disturbance, and apathy
Acute brain syndrome is usually related to a febrile, debilitating, or exhausting illness.
In the elderly it may be a side-effect of somatic illness, or it may be a symptom of
infectious disease and malnutrition that lingers long after the original condition is
controlled. In most elderly persons, its existence may be taken as presumptive evidence
of the simultaneous presence of chronic brain syndrome. Id. at 553-54; WoRx x wiTH
OLDER PEopE, VOL. II, supra note 4, at 6.
48. WoRK G wrrH OLDER POPLE, VOL. II, supra-note 4, at,6.
49. Wang, supra note 44, at 267
50. Id. at 270.
[Vol. 13.569
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mild to moderate brain impairment, the reliability and effectaveness of
this, clinical approach become more uncertain. These patients usually
present no clear-cut neurological signs, and their cognitive function,
though impaired, may still remain within the normal range of variations
one might expect in healthy old people. The pressure on the clinical
examiner to make interpretations and judgments may lead him to bias
the results of the examination by his training, experience, and personal
interests.51
The factor of subjective input in the clinical diagnosis has important
consequences in the context of civil commitment proceedings. The
clinical diagnosis purports to establish, from a medical point of view,
that the subject is mentally ill. The court is then expected to make a
further determination that this illness meets the statutory requirements
for a legal state of mental illness. The statutory norm reflects societal
judgments concerning the types of conduct, actual or potential, which
are socially intolerable. In reality, however, the clinical examiner neces-
sarily imports into the diagnosis his own judgments about socially in-
tolerable conduct,52 and to this extent he pre-empts the court's func-
tion. If the court then uncntically ratifies the medical judgment and
adopts it as the legal determination of mental illness without exercising
independent judgment, the decision-making process ceases to function
on two levels. The psychiatrist's judgment becomes the controlling
determination on the legal issue of mental illness.5
Even where the court does exercise its independent judgment, the
statutory criteria it must apply are often inadequate. The court must
decide that, as a result of mental illness, the patient is dangerous to
others or himself or needs care and treatment.
The "dangerousness" criteria call for a determination of what acts
51. Id.
52. Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist m the Determination of
Incompetency: A Skeptical Inquiry in to the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14
Sy-AtcusE L. REv. 564, 570 (1963); Livermore, supra note 37, at 80.
53. Kaplan, Civil Commitment "As You Like It," 49 B.U.L. REv. 14 (1969); Leifer,
supra note 52, at 573; Ross, supra note 29, at 961-63; Swartz, "Mental Disease" The
,Groundwork for Legal Analysis and Legislative Action, ill U. PA. L. REv. 389
(196 ); Szasz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally I1, 9 Crj-v.-MA. L. REv. 399 (1960).
More specific applications to, the aged are. found m Brenner, Denial of Due Process
and Civil Rights under Sections 73 and 73a of the Mental Hygiene Law to Aged
Seniles without Major Mental Impairment, 34. N.Y. ST. B.J. 19 (1962); DeCam, Com-
mitment Procedures and the Non-mentally Ill, 33 N.Y. ST. BJ. 151 (1961); -Note,
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Due Process for the. Aged, 7 CATH. LAw. 243 (1961).
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are dangerous and how likely it is that these acts will occur.5 4 The
judgment that an act is dangerous is not as self-evident as might appear.
It certainly includes an act which creates a serious risk of physical or
psychical harm to another. But arguably the criterion might also in-
clude any act which adversely affects the social interests of another,
particularly if the criminal law has labelled such an act a crime. Thus,
one court recently held that the probability that the accused would
issue checks drawn on insufficient funds was enough to fall within the
statutory test of "dangerous to others." 55 The test might be broadened
still further to encompass an act which merely offends or disquiets
others.
The prediction about the probability of an act's occurence also lacks
precision. There are no actuarial data available to indicate the relative
likelihood that certain classes of mentally ill persons will commit dan-
gerous acts. Even if such information were available, it is arguable
that "it is improbable that it would indicate [that] the likelihood of
crime within a group of individuals with any particular psychosis
would be any greater than that to be expected in a normal community
cross-section." 56 Even the criminal, who has, by defintion, committed
a prior allegedly criminal act, cannot be confined on the basis of pre-
dictions about his future conduct.
If a sociologist predicted that a person was eighty percent likely
to commit a felonious act, no law would permit his confinement.
On the other hand, if a psychologist testified that a person was
mentally ill and eight percent likely to commit a dangerous act,
the patient would be committed.57
In effect, commitment under the dangerousness criteria is a system of
preventive detention.55
Various remedies have been proposed. One approach is to define
precisely by statute the type of harm feared, the degree of risk that
it will occur, and the type of evidence necessary to support these con-
54. Livermore, supra note 37, at 81-82, 84.
55. Id. at 84.
56. Id. at 83. It has been suggested that systematized research into the factors which
lead to anti-social conduct would equip a court to predict more accurately future
dangerousness. Tao, Some Problems Relating to Compulsory Hospttalizatton of the
Mentally 111, 44 J. URAN L. 459, 477 (1967).
57. Note, Civil Comrmtment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV_
L. REv. 1288, 1290 (1966).
58. Dershowitz, supra note 14, at 47
[Vol. 13"569"580
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clusions.59 Evidentiary standards for proving dangerousness also could
be. raised, replacing the traditional preponderance of the evidence test
with a requirement that the finder of fact be persuaded by clear and
convincing evidence. 60
Dershowitz believes that the problem will continue as long as the
law continues to ask the dispositive questions in medical rather than
in -legally functional terms.6' He offers the following examples of the
questions courts should ask in place of the traditional criteria:
What sorts of anticipated harm warrant involuntary comnumt-
ment? How likely must it be that the harm will occur? Must
there be, a significant component of harm to others, or may it be
to self alone? If harm to self is sufficient, must the person also be
incapable, because he lacks insight, of veighmg the risks to him-
self against the costs of confinement?
How long a period of involuntary confinement is justified to
prevent what sorts of harms? Must the likelihood, of the harm
increase as the severity decreases? Or as the component of harm
to others increases? 62
The proposed recodification of the New York Mental Hygiene Law
supplies a good model for revised legislation. The criterion of danger-
ousnesg is replaced by a test that the patient has a mental illness for
which immediate m-patient care and treatment in a hospital is ap-
propriate and which is "likely to result in serious harm to himself
or others." 6i Such "likelihood of serious harm" means either
(1) substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by
threats of or attempts at smcide or serious bodily harm or other
conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself or (2) a
substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by
homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in
reasonable fear of serious physical harm.64
59. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 34.
60. Note, supra note 57, at 1291.
61. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power m Civil Comnitment: A Knife That Cuts
Both Ways, 2 PSYCH. TODAY 13, 44 (Feb. 1969).
62. Id.
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The criterion of need for care or treatment is the typical statutory
basis of hospitalizing the elderly. The motive is idealistic: society acts
for the individual's own benefit, and it decides for him as it assumes
he would decide for himself if he were of sound mind.65 The essential
finding of a court, as the Public Health Draft Act describes it, is "that
a person is mentally ill, needs treatment in a mental hospital and, be-
cause of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make re-
sponsible decisions with respect to his need for hospitalization." 66 The
Commentary to the Act adds:
It should be emphasized that it is not a question of the individual
agreeing or disagreeing with medical judgment as to the nature of
his illness or the need for hospital care, but rather of whether he
is capable of makang a responsible, not necessarily a wise decision.
67
It is not clear what factors should be weighed in evaluating "capacity"
to make a responsible decision, nor exactly what constitutes a re-
sponsible decision. In Kafkaesque fashion, an unwise decision in itself
may constitute some evidence of a lack of capacity to make a respon-
sible decision.
The proposed New York recodification represents little advance in
solving these problems. It defines "need of involuntary care and treat-
ment" as meaning that a "person has a mental illness for which care and
treatment as a patient in a hospital is essential to such person's welfare
and whose judgment is so impaired that he is unable to understand the
need for such care and treatment." 6
The Procedure
Several types of commitment procedures evolved out of the reform
movement of the late nineteenth century These may be classified as
(1) voluntary, where the prospective patient himself initiates or actively
participates in his admission; (2) non-protested, when, without initia-
tive or resistance, the patient acquiesces in hospitalization; and (3)
65. Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally
Iii, 1969 Dtut LJ. 677, 685 (1969); Note, supra note 57, at 1295; Note, Civil Restraint,
Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YA. L.J. 87 (1967).
66. ABF, supra note 8, at 20.
67. Id.




involuntary, when the patient is committed for an indefinite period
through judicial proceedings or on the basis of medical certification
against his will.6 9 This article will concentrate on involuntary judicial
proceedings, with some reference to commitment by medical certifi-
cation.
From the beginning, court hospitalization proceedings reflected a
basic ambiguity about their precise'nature. On the one hand the crmi-
nal trial was taken as the model, and thus requirements of notice, hear-
mg, counsel, and a jury were written into many statutes.70 Yet at the
same time, the reformers recognized that the prospective patient was
not actually guilty of wrongful conduct and that commitment was
intended for treatment purposes and was in the patient's own best in-
terests, and therefore a civil label was attached to the proceedings.
The 1961 survey of state legislation well illustrates this ambiguity.
Thirty-seven jurisdictions had adopted judicial hospitalization pro-
cedures.7'1 Half of these jurisdictions permitted any person to file an
application to have another person committed, but in the remaming
states the right to apply was limited to spouses, relatives, friends, guard-
ians, public officials, physicians, or superintendents of hospitals.7 2 This
pattern of authorization works well enough if all of these persons are
empowered in a specific state or if the patient is living with his family
in a state with more limited authorizations. But where the elderly live
alone, as they frequently do, no one in the commumty has the responsi-
bility or authority to intervene. 73  Social workers are reluctant to
intiate hospitalization proceedings out of fear of the legal consequences
of wrongful commitment, and social agencies often are ignorant of or
misunderstand the alternatives to commitment.74 In many commum-
ties, the lack of a practical means to obtain a medical diagnosis of
mental illness further complicates the problem. The easy solution to all
of these problems is to substitute crminmal arrest by the police for hos-
pitalization proceedings by the courts.
69. ABF, supra note 8, at 23; RocK, supra note 35, at 33.
70. ABF, supra note 8, at 23. For a description of the worst features of the
"criunnal" approach to comnitment proceedings, compare Note, Analysis of Legal and
Medical Considerations in Commitment of the Mentally 11l, 56 YA~m L.J. 1178, 1181
(1947), with GRouP FOR Alv mac T oF PsycmATRY, REPORT, COMMITMENT PRO-
CEDRES 2 (No. 4, April 1948) [hereinafter cited as COMMTmmNT PROCEDURES], as
quoted in ABF, supra note 8, at 30.
71. ABF, supra note 8, at 23.
72. Id.
78. Roc, supra note 35, at 253-55.
74. Id. at 86.
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Once the proceedings begin, many procedural safeguards for the
prospective patient are lacking. Only half of the states require that
notice of the forthcoming proceedings be sent to the patient himself.75
Some states permit waiver of the requirement and others allow substi-
tuted notice to certain classes of persons likely to be associated with
the patient. But even the required notice may turn out to be a hollow
formality, since it may come only 24 hours before the proceedings are
scheduled to begin.76 Most states require an actual hearing, but few
demand that waiver of his right be express.77 Only 10 jurisdictions
demand the presence of the patient at the hearing, while some leave
the matter to the court's discretion and others provide for it only if
requested by the patient.
The atmosphere of ambiguity persists through the proceedings them-
selves. Most jurisdictions permit counsel or a guardian ad litem to
represent the patient, but only some of them require his presence, and
a few more require counsel only on the patient's request.78  Several
studies have concluded, however, that such representation is often a
sterile formality which provides little-or no protection for the patient.79
One cause of the trouble is the inadequate compensation allotted to
private attorneys. The impact, if any, of the legal services program
in this area has not yet been assessed. Another reason lies in the con-
fusion surrounding the attorney's role in commitment proceedings,
which lack the adversarial nature with which he is familiar.80 The
attorney may also be ignorant of the technical complexity of mental
hygiene laws, psychiatry, psychiatric terms, and intra-disciplinary dis-
75. ABF, supra note 8, at 26. Psychiatrists have objected to nonce and hearing
on the grounds that they might produce a traumatic effect on the patient. This opinion
assumes the existence of the very mental illness which the hearing purports to estab-
lish, and it ignores the trauma of the patient who suddenly finds himself confined to
a mental hospital. Kitre, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of
Due Process, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 28, 48 (1960).
76. Ross, supra note 29, at 968-69.
77. ABF, supra note 8, at 27
78. Id. at 29. A more recent survey of state legislation found that 22 jurisdictions
made the appointment of counsel mandatory if requested by the patient, while 42
jurisdictions had some provision for appearance of counsel or a guardian ad litem.
Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Comnntment of the Mentally Ill, 44
TEXAS L. REv. 424, 460-66 (1966).
79. Cohen, supra note 78, at 427, 448; Johnson, Due Process in Involuntary Civil
Conimtment and Incompetency Adjudication Proceedings: Where Does Colorado
Stand?, 46 DENVER L.J. 516, 566 (1969).
80. Johnson, supra note 79, at 528.
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putes.81 The end result is that the attorney in a commitment proceed-
Ing often assumes little more than a ceremonial role, and the medical
diagnosis takes the dominant place. 2
No state requires a jury trial, and only 10 authorize it if requested
by the patient or his representative, while three others leave it to the
court's discretion.8 3 But those that authorize it fail to require that the
patient be notified of this right, and it is therefore seldom exercised.
Courts are divided on the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to the use in these proceedings of the patient's
statements to a psychiatrist.8 Only one state appears to give the patient
the right to bring relatives, friends, or advisors to the psychiatric
evaluation."5
Apart from abandomng involuntary commitment altogether, 6 the
basic solution to the shortcomings of the judicial commitment process
is to drop the civil label and treat the proceedings as essentially crinu-
nal, in recognition of the reality that they deprive the patient of his
personal liberty against his will. All of the fundamental rights that de-
fendants posses in the criminal trial would then be made applicable to
these proceedings.
In several recent cases the Supreme Court has abandoned the tra-
ditional distinction between criminal and civil proceedings.8 7 The de-
cision of In re Gault held that juvenile court proceedings must contain
the fundamental elements of due process despite a proclaimed bene-
ficial purpose. The determining factor lay in the obvious punitive
effect of these proceedings.
The hospitalized mental patient suffers just as real a deprivation of
liberty as the juvenile, and the logic of this situation has prompted
lower courts to extend the Gault rationale to commitment proceedings.
In "Heryford v. Parker" the court held that due process requirements,
particularly the right to counsel, should be observed in proceedings to
authorize the involuntary confinement of the mentally deficient for
81. Ennis, Mental Illness, 1969-70 Annual Survey of Amencan Law, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv.
29 (1970).
82. Cohen, supra note 78, at 446.
83. ABF, supra note 8, at 28.
84. Ennms, supra note 81, at 33.
85. Id. at 40.
86. Enms, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRms. L. Bvu.. 101, 102 (1971).
87. In re Gault, 387 US. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 US. 605 (1967);
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 US. 107 '(1966).
88. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
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treatment and training. In Holm v. State"9 the failure to allow rights
of cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses in commitment
proceedings under a statute modeled on the Draft Act9° was held
unconstitutional. The rights to notice, hearing, and counsel were con-
sidered essenual in proceedings for indefinite commitment of sexually
dangerous persons according to the court in Commonweaftb v.
Gomes.9 Finally, in the most sweeping decion to date, a three judge
federal court held unconstitutional a Pennsylvama statute which per-
nutted indefinite commitment without notice or hearing 92 In ordering
discharge of the patients or meaningful commitment proceedings with-
in 60 days, the court noted that such proceedings should include a
full hearing, counsel, independent psychiatric assistance in preparation
for the proceedings at public expense, evidence of mental illness that
was clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and a transcript and record
of the proceedings. Commitment resulting from these proceedings
could last no longer than six months without a new process.
Proposed Reforms
Specific reforms in commitment proceedings should include:
1. Authorization of health and social services officials to initiate
commitment proceedings.
2. Elimination of the use of police arrest as a way of taking into
custody persons who appear to be mentally ill. Instead, peace officers
might simply be empowered to bring such persons to approved hos-
pitals for examination.
3. Personal notice to the patient, reasonably well in advance of thq
hearing, advising him of his constitutional and statutory rights. Pos-
sible traumatic effects of such notice might be reduced if relatives,
friends, or a physician give it in a congenial atmosphere.9
4. Mandatory presence of the patient at the hearing, or in the alterna-
tive, -to leave the question of his presence to the judge, with stipulations
that the judge or a court-appointed psychiatrist interview the person
privately before the hearing to see if he wants to attend. Also, the
89. 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965).
90. Note 32 supra.
91. 355 Mass. 479, 245 N.E. 2d 429 (1969).
92. Dixon v. Att'y Gen. of Pennsylvama, 325 F. Supp.,966-(M.D. Pa. 1971).
93. See note 75 supra.
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hearing should take place in a hospital or private place to mmune its
potential harmful effect on the patient.94
5. Mandatory representation by counsel. Waiver of counsel should
not be permitted, or as an alternative, the court might be empowered
to appoint an attorney as its amicus for the purpose of bringing to the
judge's attention all information about the patient's rights and con-
dition that might not otherwise appear.95 The method of providing
free counsel used in criunal matters should be expanded to include
commitment proceedings.96
6. Jury trial at the request of the patient.97 This requirement should
be correlated with the rephrasing of the criteria for commitment in
non-medical behavioral terms.98 Both steps would meet the psychia-
trists' objections that shameful associations induced by appearance be-
fore a jury will harm the patient, prompt his relatives to postpone his
commitment and treatment, and add to the emotional stress of his even-
tual return to the community,99 and that juries lack the ability to de-
termine the highly technical question of mental illness.,-"
7 Presence of an attorney, relative, or friend at the psychiatric inter-
view, or at least a tape recording or transcript of the interview avail-
able to the patient.'0'
8. For indigent persons, independent psychiatric assistance should be
available at public expense, subject to the privilege of confidentiality
9 The evidentiary standard should be raised to require that danger-
ousness or need of care and treatment be established beyond a reason-
94. But see Note, supra note 57, at 1292.
95. 1d.
96. It has also been suggested that the dunes of counsel be defined by statute. ABF,
supra note 8, at 29; Cohen, supra note 78, at 458-59; Johnson, supra note 79, at 566.
But this approach might prove inadequate without an available group of lawyers
with expertise m this area. Ennis, supra note 81, at 29.
97. Trial judges consider the jury trial unimportant in most cases, although some
think a jury is of value when the patient is senile. AssOcrAnoT op im BAR OF Tim
Crry oF NEw YoRK, MiNrAL ILLNEss AND DuE PRocEss 191 (1962).
98. See text accompanying notes 56-65 supra.
99. Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally 111, 50 MicH. L. REv. 837, 848-49 (1952).
100. Commrrvmrr Paocmuams, supra note 70, at 2. Some states have attempted to
supply medical expertise by requiring that a doctor or a psycuatrist be a member of
all commitment juries, but the reality of such a practice is that the physcian, especially
one actively engaged in commitment proceedings, tends to support the recommendations
of the county psychiatrist and because of his expertise has a great influence on the
rest of the jury Kutner, The illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings,
57 Nw. UJ-. REv. 383, 391 (1962).
101. Ennis, supra note 81, at 37
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able doubt or by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by the
preponderance of the evidence.1 2
In an attempt to compromise between the legal and medical con-
siderations involved in commitment proceedings, several states now
authorize short-term hospitalization by medical certificate alone.'0 3 De-
tailed examination of these procedures'" is beyond the scope of this
essay, but they contain in varying degrees a common problem: to
what extent confinement for any period is tolerable without consent
or a judicial hearing. It is submitted that confinement of this type
should be allowed only in emergency circumstances where the patient
is dangerous according to a narrow definition of the term and the de-
tention is for a period no longer than is needed to arrange for a full
hearing. Where the criterion is need for care and treatment, a full
hearing should be held prior to confinement.
The Process of Treatment
What happens to the elderly person upon admission to a mental
hospital? One strong possibility is that he will die within the first year.
Older persons who enter state hospitals have an excessive death rate,
that is, a much larger proportion of them die than would be expected
in comparison with age-sex specific death rates. 10 5 This phenomenon
may be due to the fact that they are already dying when they are
committed and that the prodromal signs of death are mistaken for
psychosis. Physical disability may have been a factor in their admis-
102. Ennis, supra note 86, at 110.
103. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. S 21-501 et seq. (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 5-1
et seq. (1965); N.Y. MENrAL. HYGIENE LAW S 71 et seq. (1966). See also Tao, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the District of Columbia, 13 How LJ. 303
(1967); Note, The New York Mental Health Information Service: A New Approach
to Hospitalization of the Mentally ill, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 672 (1967); Comment, The
New Mental Health Codes: Safeguards m Compulsory Commitment and Release, 61
Nw U.L. REv. 977 (1967).
104. For a discussion of medical admission procedures, see ABF, supra note 8,
at 32, 34-35.
105. Markson, The Geriatric House of Death: Hiding the Dying Elder in a Mental
Hospital, 1 AGiNG & HuMAN DEvE opmENT 37 (1970). The same study shows that
one-fourth of the elderly admissions died within one month after entrance. Id. at 48.
Mortality rates as high as sixty percent have been reported for the first year after
admission. One study of 100 consecutive admissions to a state hospital reported that
one-third of the aged patients, of whom a majority had brain syndrome, died m the
first year. Berezen & Stotsky, The Geriatric Patient, m TmE PRAcncE OF CoMMUNrIT
MENTAL HEALTH 220 (Grunebaum ed. 1970).
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-sion, particularly when it occurred from another institution such as a
general hospital. The general hospital sometimes transfers to the state
mental hospital elderly patients who fail to respond to treatment or
take too long to die.' 6 Older rather than younger persons are selected
for transfer because of the extreme pressure for beds and because they
are considered helpless by family and physicians.
The very fact of institutionalization may also shorten the life-span
of an elderly person. One study has concluded that first year mortality
rates in a home for the aged were related to the impact of institution-
alization on the aged.1 7 Several other studies indicate that the chances
of survival of older persons having severe brain dysfunction following
relocation to an institution are considerably less than those of a person
who shows no or only minimal signs of such impairment, regardless of
how emotionally or socially disturbed or maladjusted such a person
may be.108
The mental hospital also has a tremendous psychological impact on
those who enter its doors. 09 The loss of familiar objects, well-learned
patterns of daily living, and environmental clues produces a feeling of
defeat and uselessness. Those who had the fewest opportunities in
youth are usually affected worst by the experience. In reaction, the
newly institutionalized person may adopt bizarre defensive behavior
which only isolates him further.
Fatalism is in the air. The hospital program begins to structure the
patient's remaining life as an extended act of dying rather than one of
active physical or psychiatric treatment.ii' Once the routine post-
admission examination is performed, most geriatric patients are then
given "failing status because of age and general debility" This desig-
nation is almost automatic and is not associated with the presence of
physical illness, ability to walk, or chronological age.
Besides the problems of overcrowding"' and understaffing," 2 which
are experienced in common with other patients of all age groups, the
106. Markson, supra note 105, at 43.
107. Leiberman, Relationship of Mortality Rates to Entrance to a Home for the
Aged, 16 GERITitics 515 (1961).
108. Blenkner, Environmental Change and the Aging Indivndual, 7 GFRoNrowGisr 101
(1967).
109. Barray, Social Sermces for the Aged: A Reconsideration, in NEw THOUGHTS
ox OL AGE 207-08 (Kastenbaum ed. 1964).
110. Markson, supra note 105, at 42.
111. Rocm, supra note 35, at 69-70.
112. Id.
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elderly patient is condemned to his own special kind of neglect. The
American Bar Foundation noted:
In each institution we studied, a number of wards were devoted to
the care of elderly patients suffering from a variety of physical ill-
nesses compounded by the debilitating effects of age itself. The
attention they received was limited to nursing care. Few were dis-
charged from the hospital since they were there because of their
family's inability to care for them and the lack of suitable alterna-
tives to meet their needs. For them the state hospital is the end
of the road.113
The practice of many mental hospitals to provide only custodial
care is open to challenge on both medical and legal grounds. From a
medical point of view, Goldfarb refuses to accept the conclusion that
treatment of the elderly is futile." 4 Emotional factors in the elderly
person may have provoked him to exhibit disorganized behavior, and
this in turn may lead to an overestimate of the amount of cerebral
damage and physical impairment. Many patients who are passed by as
confused and senile have been found in psychiatric examination to be
depressed, anxious, or angry, and classifiable as psychoneurotic despite
some degree of chronic brain syndrome." 5 Many of their disorders
are transient and will respond quickly to combined physical, phar-
macologic, and psychological treatment. In all cases, even with seem-
ingly grossly brain-damaged patients, psychotherapeutic attempts are
justified. He concludes:
An important ann of mental hospitals should be the treatment and
good management of aged persons, not merely their "custody" as
compared to active treatment of younger persons." 6
The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry takes the same posi-
tion:
Irreversibility must never be casually (and stereotypically) as-
sumed. Many mental disorders affecting the aged are subject to
amelioration. Acute brain'syndromes intervene in the course of
113. Id. at 70-71.
114. Goldfarb, The Psychotherapy of Older Patients, in AGiNG ARouND THE Worui:
MElICAL AND CINCAL ASPECTS OF AGING 106-07 (Blumenthal ed. 1962).
115. Id. at 107
116. Id.
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chronic brain syndromes and are reversible. Depressive, paranoid,
and behavioral reactions may be components m the clinical course
of patients with organic brain damage and can be controlled. De-
pression may be masked as an organic state and, if recognized, can
be treated.117
Further support for these opinions lies in Lowenthal's findings that 40
percent of acute brain syndromes are potentially reversible by medical
management with supportive social services.118
The legal basis for a right to treatment begins with the decision in
Rouse v. Cameron.119 The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Bazelon, held that per-
sons involuntarily committed to a mental hospital had a statutory right
to treatment based on the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act
of the District. The Act provided that "a person hospitalized in a men-
tal hospital for a mental illness shall, during the hospitalization, be
entiled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment." 12 0 The Court
declined, however, to decide the constitutional issues raised by a failure
to provide such treatment, although it suggested that due process, equal
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment arguments would be
appropriate.iai
A constitutional basis for a right to treatment has appeared for the
first time in Wyatt v. Stickney 122 Chief Judge Johnson of the U.S.
District Court found that Alabama's failure to afford adequate medical
treatment to the geriatric and mentally retarded patients it had civilly
committed for treatment violated "the very fundamentals of due proc-
ess.' 2  The court held that existmg treatment practices at Bryce
Hospital at Tuscaloosa, the state's leading mental institution, were
"scientifically and medically inadequate" and "failed to conform to
117. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 79, TOWARD A PUBLIC
POLICY ox MENTAL HEALTH CARE OF THE ELDERLY 664 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GROUP
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 79].
118. WoRxING WITH OLDER PEOPLE, VOL. II, supra note 4.
119. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
12Q. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1967).
121. The New York courts also followed the statutory route in People ex rel.
Whitree v. LaBurt, 17 N.Y.2d 738, 270 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1966). The court advised the
patient to use the adnumstrative procedures provided by the legislature to investigate
care and treatment. These procedures included the authorization given to the Com-
missioner of Mental Health to conduct such investigations and the Mental Health
Information Service, which is empowered to conduct periodic review of all patients.
122. 325 F. Supp. 781 (D. Ala. 1971).
123. Id. at 785.
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any known minmum established for providing treatment for the men-
tally ill." 124 The failure to provide such treatment transformed the
mental institution into a penitentiary 125
The remedy chosen by the court was to give the state six months
to submit evidence that it had established fully appropriate mental
health treatment programs. Judge Johnson requested that the Justice
Department, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and
the Public Health Service enter the case to assist in drawing up new
procedures for treatment and custody, to aid the state in qualifying for
Social Security benefits for the geriatric patients, and to help plan the
relocation of the geriatric patients to other facilities. If the State failed
to take these steps, the court said it would appoint a "panel of experts
in the area of mental health to determine what objective and subjective
standards will be required to furmsh adequate treatment to the treatable
mentally ill." 128
The court's discussion of due process considerations is brief. If the
state commits a person for treatment purposes, then it must validate the
deprivation of liberty by providing actual treatment. The court cited
the Rouse decision as support for its conclusion, but failed to advert
to the statutory basis in Rouse. The court's choice of a remedy is
ambitious, but its effectiveness remains to be seen. The moment of
truth for Alabama might come only if the court ordered the patients
released.
Critics of the right to treatment decisions question the competence
of the courts to define treatment, 12 7 to appraise its adequacy, or to pro-
vide an appropriate remedy 128 They believe that the problems of
definition and evaluation are best left to the medical profession, which
even in its own rank is unable to agree on these matters. They also
argue that the legislature should supply the remedy, since the issue
124. Id. at 784.
125. Id., citing Ragsdall v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (1960).
126. Id. at 786.
127. Council of the American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on the
Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PsYCmATRY 1458 (1967).
128. Bazelon, Foreword (to Symposium on the Right to Treatment), 57 GEO. L.J. 676
(1969). See also Bassionni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Care and Treatment:
Medical Due Process, 15 DEPAtL L. REv. 29 (1966); Livermore, supra note 37, at 93
n.53; Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment in Pennsylvania,
15 VmL.. L. REV. 95 (1970); Note, Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 11374
(1967); Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YArm
L.J. 87 (1967).
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,concerns a basic policy judgment involving overall priorities in the
allocation of social resources.
In response, one nught point out that courts are likely to be as
competent in reviewing right of treatment cases as they are in review-
ing the actions of administrative agencies having expertise in other
areas. The judge need only decide "whether the patient is receiving
carefully chosen therapy which respectable professional opimon re-
gards as within the range of appropriate alternatives, not whether the
patient is receiving the best of all possible treatment in the best of all
possible mental hospitals." 129 Such an inquiry would proceed at two
levels. The court would first examine objective factors, such as the
degree to which the hospital possesses the staff and resources to pro-
vide treatment to all its patients.130 It would then look at the treat-
ment of the individual patient, and in so doing, it might use as a guide
the Social Security Administration's defimtion of "active treatment,"
which is employed for the purpose of reimbursing hospitals for services
rendered to Medicare patients. 13
The final objection goes to the very rationale for the hospitalization
process. When, through its laws, the state legislature bases its depriva-
tions of liberty, at least partially, upon a promise of treatment, it has
already committed the commumty's resources to providing adequate
facilities. If the legislature then dishonors the promise, involuntary and
indeterminate hospitalization amounts to no more than preventive de-
tention, and the mental hospital becomes a jail.
All of this assumes that the patient is treatable. What about the
elderly who can no longer be treated but only held in custody, after
all known courses of treatment have been exhausted? 32 The aged
person might be given the option of remaining as a voluntary patient.
The logic of the situation however, appears to demand that he be re-
129. Id. See also Baze'on, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv.
742 (1969).
130. This proposal appears to contradict M. Birnbaum's reading of the Rouse
decision as calling for on'y subjective standards in evaluating the adequacy of treatment.
See Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEO. LJ. 752, 753 (1969). Birnbaum is
the author of the concept of a "right to treatment." Birnbaum, The Right to Treat-
ment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
131. 20 C.F.R. 5 405.1036-38 (1971). Even this approach is too objective for one
writer who fears that the patient might still not be treated under these standards
according to Iis individual needs. Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to
Treatment, 57 GEo. LJ. 782, 790 (1969).
,132. See text accompanying notes 116-126 supra. See a!so Katz, The Right to
Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cmi. L. REv. 755, 766 (1969).
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leased if he so desires and allowed to choose his own lifestyle. 133 If this
course of action is too drastic, then the only alternative open to the
state is revision of its commitment laws to permit hospitalizationfor
custodial purposes alone, but with a provision that the case for such
detention be supported by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
proof required for criminal mcarceraton. 34
Alternate Methods of Care
The latent irony in the storage of the elderly in state mental hos-
pitals is that large numbers of them do not really belong there. A3
early as 1955 the Council of State Governments noted evidence that
a substantial number of new admissions to mental hospitals who were
65 years of age and over mght not require hospital service, but could
be better cared for in other kinds of facilities.'35 The American Bar
Foundation Report cited a study of the conditions in Texas, which
asserted that "seventy percent of all patients do not need to be in
a mental hospital. They could be treated at home, in climcs,
or other institutions." 13 6 Another study showed that nearly one-third
of the elderly patients in one hospital and nearly one-half in another
were thought to be able to return to the commumty 137 In the majority
of cases, a group home, attendance at a day care center, or some super-
vision in the home seemed sufficient. In addition, a significant percent-
age of the elderly in both hospitals were thought suitable for nursing
home care because they had minmal psychiatric symptoms but their
physical condition required nursing care. Only the remaining one-
quarter of the patients in these hospitals was felt to be suitably placed
in the psychiatric hospital.
Other studies have shown that many of the elderly admitted to mental
hospitals probably do not differ appreciably from elderly people still
in the commumty or in nursing homes. 3 8 Their hospitalization is more
133. See Twersk, Treating the Untreatable-A Critique of the Proposed Pennsylvania
Right to Treatment Law, 9 DuQuESNm L. REv. 220 (1970).
134. See Bazelon supra note 129, at 748.
135. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTs, THE STATES AND THEIR OLDER CITIZENS, A
REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS CONFERENCE 38 (1955). See also Kolb, Mental Hospitaliza-
tion of the Aged: Is It Being Overdone?, 112 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 627 (1956).
136. ABF, supra note 8, at 19.
137. Markson, Kwoh, J. Cumming & E. Cumming, Alternatives to Hospitalization
for Psychiatrically Ill Geriatric Patients, 127 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 1055, 1060 (1971).
138. E. Markson & J. Hand, Referral for Death: Low Status of the Aged and Re-




often a reflection of certain socially unacceptable characteristics,' 9
rather than a greater degree of mental impairment than their con-
temporaries elsewhere. 40 Lack of education, low status occupation
before retirement, low socio-economic status, and birth in a foreign
country have been found to be the primary characteristics of the
elderly in psychiatric hospitals. If social value is measured by pro-
ductive capacity, then the aged poor have a double low-status role in
society which thus helps to hasten their admission to a mental hospital.
It has also been suggested that many of the hospitalized elderly may
simply have had strokes or toxic confusions mimickmg psychotic symp-
toms.' 41 The most common complaint (40 percent) made by those
seeking admission of the eldrly was that they were senile, that is, forget-
ful, confused, wandering, likely to leave the gas stove on, and so forth.
Another six percent were described as nervous but not senile or de-
mented, and nine percent were just aggressive. Thus, nearly 50 percent
of the elderly patients had been adnutted on the grounds of senility or
nervousness, both of which are questionable bases for inpatient psychi-
atric care.
Practical solutions to the misplacement problem have taken two
forms. In New York the State Department of Mental Hygiene directed
in 1968 that only elderly patients in need of hospitalization to obtain
psychiatric care and treatment be admitted to state mental hospitals."12
Persons whose problems were primarily physical, social, or economic
and who would more appropriately be treated by another facility would
not be accepted." 3 The Department pointed out that the former prac-
tice of easier admission was a burden on the hospitals to which they
were not equipped to respond, and it removed from the community
the necessity for developing adequate services to solve such problems.
139. Bennett & Nahemow, Social Adjustment in Residences for the Aged, 21 J.
SocAL IssuEs 44, 60 (1965).
140. Markson & Hand, supra note 138, at 5.
141. Id. at 4-5.
142. N.Y. State Department of Mental Hygiene, Division of Mental Health, Memo-
randum N. 68-27 (June 19, 1968).
143. N.Y. State Department of Mental Hygiene, Division of Mental Health, Guide-
lines for Adrmission and Referral of Elderly Patients (April, 1969), advised that elderly
patients who had a serious physical disability with minor mental disorder, serious
physical disease with mental symptoms arising as a direct result of the physical--"acute
brain syndrome,"-or socio-econormc need with no significant mental and physical
pathology be demed admission to state mental hospitals. Those with irreversible mental
disorder with or without physical disability would be admitted on a case by case
basis in view of individual circumstances.
1972]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The short term result of this policy was to reduce the geriatric ad-
missions to the mental hospitals from 330 per 100,000 to 142 per
100,000 in 1969 144 The long term result cannot be measured as yet.
Proposals were formulated by interested social agencies calling for
commumty-based geriatric centers, expansion of nursing homes and
their services, broadening of -the services of the state mental hospitals
to care for some of the elderly being denied admission, and the enact-
ment of conservatorship legislation. But these were proposals, not pro-
grams, and the reality is that the mental hospitals demed admission
to many elderly as a move designed to cause a crisis in services, know-
ing that no adequate facilities then existed to care for many of those
turned away 145
The American Psychiatric Association condemned this practice:
An arbitrary admimstrative decision to exclude elderly patients
from adrmssion to state hospitals [should be based on hard data].
Certainly some elderly patients will become chronic residents, but
who can determine the outcome of treatment before it is insti-
tuted? Who should treat persons who do not have remedial con-
ditions? When the aim of treatment is to obtain an optimum level
of functioning, then one considers a wide spectrum of services,
with some resources in the "community," and others in institutions
such as our state mental hospitals. At present, it is quite clear that
many elderly persons need institutional care for physical and men-
tal impairment. Philosophically, one may conclude that nursing
homes belong to the "community" and state hospitals do not, but
the difference is semantic, not a functional distinction. State de-
partments of mental health cannot discharge their overall responsi-
bility without provision of care for some elderly persons who have
chronic illness, both physical and mental. 148
The Presidential Task Force, in its report issued in preparation for the
Vvite House Conference on Aging in November, 1971, also expressed
concern about
144. COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, PROFILE OF THE AGED IN NEw YORK
CrrI 3 (1970).
145. COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, THE ELDERLY AND THE STATE MENTAL
HospriA IN NEw YORK STATE 5-10 (1969). For a defense of the hospital policy, see
Miller, The Changing Role of the State Hospital, If NEw YOR STATE OFFICE FOR Tm
AGING, PROCEEDINGS, EIGHTH AN AL GovEmuoR's CoNmNcE ON AGING 29 (1969).
146. AAmRIcAN PsYcHIAiuc AsSoCUTIoN, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AGING ON
Ontmct. IssuEs FACING TmE 1971 WmTE HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING 5 (undated).
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indiscriminate regulation against the admission of older patients to
public psycuatric facilities and recent trends toward release of
elderly patients from State institutions primarily because they are
old m the face of the absence of community services to support
these released patients 147
By contrast, Pennsylvania has shown in an experimental program
that many long-term patients 65 years of age and older have "restora-
tive potential" when moved out of the state mental hospital into a
geriatric center, designed and operated exclusively for them. 4s Seventy
percent of the first 700 patients in the program responded favorably to
therapy and had improved sufficiently to return to community housing
or to simplified care settings.
Other states have attempted to solve the problem by transferring
elderly patients from state mental hospitals to extended care faciliteg
in order to attract larger federal payments under Medicare. 49 Several
studies have noted, however, that, even with careful preparation of
the patient before his transfer, mortality increased in the relocated
population. Moreover, often the placement is in a nursing home that
provides no psychiatric care. To counteract this trend, the Group for
the Advancement of Psychiatry recommended:
We must speak of alternatives not only between an adequate and
comprehensive mental hospital and other community facilities, but
also among various kinds of treatment aged patients need to
receive vthin the hospital. All too often, there exists a sole
"program" for the geriatrics ward or for all the patients aged 65
and over m state hospitals.'80
The judicial response to the problem begins with the decision in
Lake v. Cameron.'51 The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
147. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON THE AGING, TOWARD A BRIGT= FuTURE FOR THE
ELDERLY. 34 (1970).
148. COMMUNrY SERvicE SociErT OF NEw YoiT, AGED LoNG-TERM HosprrAL PA-
TIENTs SHOW 'RESTORATIVE PoTinamA" I (undated), reprinted from 5 FaoN=rrns IN
HosmrrAl, PSyCHIATRY (No. 17, Oct. 15, 1968).
149. GRouP FOR Tm ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHATRY, REPORT No. 79, supra note 117,
at 662. For a survey of the use of alternate facilites In some European countries,
see Kleemexer, The Mental Health of the Aging, In AGING IN WEsTERN SocIErEs 203,
205-06 (Burgess ed. 1960).
150. Id. at 665.
151. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See NATIONAL CouNcu. ON AGING, THE LAw
AND TE IMPAIREI OwR PERSON: PRoEcrtioN OR PUNIMSAMENT (Hall ed. 1966).
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lumbia Circuit remanded a habeas corpus proceeding to the District
Court for inquiry into alternative courses of treatment in place of
confinement at St. Elizabeth's Hospital. The petitioner had been con-
fined there after having been found wandering about, and had been
diagnosed as suffering from chronic brain syndrome associated with
aging and loss of memory She also had wandered from the hospital
on one occasion. She was not considered dangerous to others nor would
she intentionally harm herself, but apparently her condition left her
open to accidental injury or abuse from others. The Hospitalization
of the Mentally Ill Act provided that if a court or jury found that a
person is mentally ill and, because of that illness, is likely to injure
himself or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the court
may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order
any other alternative course of treatment which the court believes
will be in the best interests of the person or the public. 152
The court was careful to confine the basis for the remand to the statu-
tory provision authorizing alternative courses of treatment where
appropriate. It expressed no opinion on the constitutional issues, such
as "whether so complete a deprivation of appellant's liberty basically
because of her poverty could be reconciled with due process of law
and the equal protection of the laws," that would arise if the district
court on remand should find no available alternative to confinement at
St. Elizabeth's.
The decision, while significant in its aspirations, is not likely to have
any far-reaching effects. Its narrow statutory basis means that it is of
precedent value only in jurisdictions having similar statutes. The New
Mexico Supreme Court refused to follow it in the absence of similar
legislation.i15 Even the District Court in the District of Columbia,
upon remand, found its hands tied. 4 After finding that the patient
needed constant supervision, the court could only conclude that what-
ever the need for alternative facilities, none were available and there-
fore the patient could not be released.
Recent amendments to the Social Security Act may provide the
begimngs of a legislative solution to the problem of lack of alternate
care facilities. They may also lay the foundation for a statutory right
152. D.C. CoDE Am. § 21-545(b) (1967).
153. State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969).
154. Lake v. Cameron, 267 F Supp. 155 (D.D.C. 1967).
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to treatment generally enforceable throughout the country These
amendments authorize federal support for state plans for medical as-
sist~nce to persons 65 years of age and older who are patients in insti-
tutions for mental diseases. 15 5 The legislation requires written agree-
ments with the state agency administering the plan and with par-
ticipating institutions, which set forth their operational duties, including
stAffing and procedure."'S These agreements must also include arrange-
ments for the development of alternate methods and plans of care
outside of institutions for patients who would otherwise require insti-
tutional care and for patients no longer needing care in a mental
insntution. 57 These arrangements are designed to form part of a com-
prehensive mental health program, including community mental health
centers, nursing homes, and other alternatives to care in public mstitu-
tions for mental diseases, which the state is required to develop. 5s
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare regulations also
demand a periodic inventory of currently available alternate care ar-
rangements, an evaluation of the suitability and quality of care in such
facilities, dissemination of information about these facilities to related
local departments, and annual progress in developing new and existing
resources as needed by aged recipents.159 These alternate arrangements
include care in the patient's or a relative's home with necessary home
services, particularly homemaker services, foster family care, nursing
homes, and social care facilities.Y6 0
I The state plan must also provide for an individual plan for each
patient in an institution for mental diseases. 1s This plan should include
assurances of initial and periodic review of his medical, psychiatric, and
social needs, that he will be given appropriate medical treatment with-
in the institution, and of a periodic determination of his need for con-
tinued treatment in the institution.12 Qualifying institutions must pro-
vide medical care for every patient, 24-hour nursing service, and
155."42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (20) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 302(a) (12) (1970).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (20) (A) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 302(a) (12) (A) (1970).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (20) (A),(C) (1970).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (21) (1970).
159. FEDERAL HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PoLIcIEs AND PRocEDumes § 5230(E) (1),
(2) (Supp. D) quoted in Nathan, The "Long Amendment," 4 CLEAINGHOUSE Rav. 245,
258-59 (1970).
160. Id. at § 5230(e) (2).
161. 42 US.C. § 1396(a) (20) (B) (1970).
162. Id. See 36 Fed. Reg. 3102 (1971); 45 C.F.R. § 250.23 (1971) (expanded require-
ments intended to enforce the quality care standards).
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psychiatric services, and must comply with certain licensing and ac-
crediting procedures.16
The major difficulty in this legislation is the loophole provided by
the "maintenance of state effort" clause requiring a state to maintain
a budget in each succeeding year which exceeds what was spent in any
quarter in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965 164 As HEW itself notes,
the fact that most states have increased their budgets for mental health
on a yearly basis makes it very easy for a state to meet the requirements
of this clause.165 The increase, however, may be due simply to rising
costs and not to any stepped-up program of care for aged patients.
Having qualified for federal funds, the states need provide no further
guarantee that the additional moies will be used for new methods of
treatment and care.166 The federal government, in effect, may be pick-
mg up the bill for the increased overhead.
The answer is to amend the legislation to require a showing by the
states of increased expenditures for the programs contained in the
agreement, rather than just a showing that more money was spent for
mental health in general. Such an amendment, however, is no guarantee
that alternate care plans and facilities would start to appear. Many
states may prefer not to enter the agreement at all because of the
financial burden caused by the state portion of the expenditures.
Absent statutory reform or state participation, the only solution to
the problem of the aged person who needs treatment less drastic than
full-time confinement in a mental hospital may lie along constitutional
lines. It has been suggested 167 that the doctrine of Sbelton v. Tucker
is applicable here:
Even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose.Y' s
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1861(F) (1970).
164. 42 'U.S.C. § 1903b (1970).
165. HEW Staff Memorandum (Jan. 28, 1969), quoted n Nathan, supra note 159,
at 262-63.
166. GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 79, supra note 117,
at 684.
167. Ennis, supra note 86, at 112.
168. Shelton v Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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By this reasonmg, those recommending conumtment to a mental hos-
pital would be required to bear the burden of proving that there are
no less drastic alternatives. This argument produces the same practical
result as the decision in Lake v. Camerom it is useful for compelling
transfer where alternative methods of care exist in a jurisdiction, but
it will not create new facilities.
NoN-INsnTuTIoNAL PRoTEcTivE SERVICES
The discussion thus far has centered on involuntary civil commit-
ment, the legal prerequisite to providing institutional protective services
to many of the elderly As has been shown, the process and conse-
quences of commitment are often unfair and unnecessary This article
will now consider other legal devices designed to protect the person
and property of the non-msututionalized person and enable him to
continue living in the community in spite of some disability
The number of aged suffering a modicum of mental impairment
and/or behavioral disturbance has been put at some 15 to 20 percent
of the urban aged in the United States today-169 About half of these,
or eight percent, are thought to need some form of protective assist-
ance.170 This is a number twice that of the aged in mental hospitals,
nursing homes, or homes for the aged.
In descriptive terms, the prospective client for protective services is
an elderly person who is too frail mentally and physically to act on his
own behalf, who lives alone or is without a responsible person able,
willing, and available to assist him, who needs help in managing him-
self and his affairs, and whose mcapacity might result m hazard to
himself or others.17i The following is a composite portrait of these
clients:
[He] can't recall what he did with his funds or their source or
amount, forgets to eat, is either afraid to spend his money, or else
squanders his funds; or is constantly moving from place to place;
169. M. BLEN NEit, E. WASSER & M. BLooM, PROTECrTV SERViCEs FOR OLDER PEOPLE,
PRoGREss REPORT FOR 1966-67 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BENKNER].
170. Id. at 4; J. LY-Nss, Tim EvoLuTION OF PROTECIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE 10
(1970).
171. G. HAL, Paoarn'E SERViCES: EVOLVING CONCEMS AND PRINCIPL 4 (1966). See
also V LEHmANw & G. MATHuAsEx, GUARDiANsHP AND PRoTErcn SERVICES FOR OLDER
PEOPLE 1-2 (1963); LYNEs, supra note 170, at 10, 19. For a classification of the degrees
of incapacity among OASDI beneficiaries, see Larson, Protective Servcex for Older
Adults, 22 PuR. WELFAR 247, 248 (1964).
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or wanders the streets in the dark of mght and forgets where he
lives or has no permanent living quarters; or spends his money on
liquor and begs or starves until his next check is received; or is
living in squalor in a building that has been condemned but not
yet torn down; is using an old portable oil burner for heating and'
cooking because the gas and electricity have been turned off, or
crippled by arthritis and partly bed-ridden, continues to dwell in
his own vermin-infested house by reason of accumulated rub-
bish and rotting food remnants; refuses hospitalization for treat-
ment of infection resulting from untreated injury; or is constantly
picking quarrels with the neighbors, shouting obscemties at pass-
ers-by, using an open window as a garbage disposal unit, dressing
bizarrely; or continues to operate a small neighborhood store
with entangled business affairs; or is in immnent danger of
sustaimng grave personal injury by reason of infirmity but re-
fuses to leave home and will not accept any help within his
home. 172
The essential feature of a protective service for these clients is the
surrogate function, the legal authorization to act in behalf of the older
person, with or without his consent' 73 The balance of this article
will consider a variety of existing and proposed kinds of protective
services, ranging from the total control of a full guardianship to a
single transaction authorization.
Guardiansxp
The legal institution devised by English law to care for those persons
unable to care for themselves or their affairs but not in need of con-
finement was guardianship. It focused on the protection of the dis-
abled person's property from which his support was to be drawn dur-
ing the period of the guardianship. By contrast, commitment was in-
tended to protect the public and the person himself from his potential
acts of violence or from peril as well as to provide appropriate thera-
peutic measures for him.' 74
172. DFPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, WORKING WITH OLDER
PEoPL.E-VoL. Im: Tm AGING PERSON: NEEDs AND SERVICES 52 (1970). See also
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON AGING, SEMINAR ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE 197
(1964) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COUNCIL ON AGING].
173. Address by John Martin m LYNxs, supra note 170, at ii. See also V LEHMANN
G. MATHIASpN, supra note 171, at 1i5.




As a prerequisite for the appointment of a guardian, the disabled
person must first be declared incompetent. According to a typical
statutory formulation, an incompetent is one who, by reason of mental
illness, drunkenness, drug addiction, or old age is incapable of caring
for himself and/or managing his business affairs or providing for his
family, or is liable to dissipate us property or become the victim of
designing persons.175 The court makes two findings: (1) that a person
is mentally ill (or elderly, an alcoholic, or a drug addict), and (2) as
a result of this condition, he is unable to care for himself or manage
his property
Both the statutory criteria and the conclusion of incompetency to
which they lead are insensitive to the needs of the elderly The grounds
overemphasize mental illness or mental deficiency, defects which are
the umversal criteria in all the states, while less than half of the juris-
dictions recognize such other reasons as alcoholism, drug addiction, old
age,, spendthrift tendencies, and physical disability' 716 As a result, the
incompetent bears the stigma of being mentally ill in the popular mind.
An elderly person who has a few of the manifestations of chronic
brain syndrome, such as forgetfulness, may find these translated into
the wider conclusion that he is mentally ill and therefore incapable of
.making any decisions for himself.177
The evidence used by the courts to substantiate a finding of in-
competency may not conform to the statutory criteria. Some courts
tend to rely heavily on available medical testimony about mental ill-
ness,17s with the result that the medical judgment, which is normally
relevant only toward the first finding, tends to dominate the -second
find.ing, which should bea non-medical or behavioral judgment re-
served for the trier of fact.179 The more. common practice in the courts,
however, is that psychiatrists rarely testify in incompetency proceed-
171. Id. For a general discussion of the criteria used by the courts for determining
incompetency, see Annot., 9 AIL.R.3d 774 (1966). For a list of the jurisdictions which
specify old age as a factor, see Alexander, Surrogate Management of the Property of
the Aged, 21 SYRACUsE L. REv. 87, 93. (1969).
1.76. ABF, supra note 8, at 219.
i7 . Lehmann,, Guardianship, in SoctA WErFARE oF Tm AG 4G..312 (Kaplan & Aid-
rdgq eds. 1962).
J'78. JAlexander, supranote 175, at.130.
179. Comment, Appointment of Guardians for the- Mentally -1ncon~etnt,' 1964,-DtkE
L.J. 341, 345.
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mgs. 80 Courts then concentrate on evidence of erratic behavior of the
alleged incompetent, particularly in terms of mismanagement of his
property If there is any evidence of mental weakness, the property
mismanagement is presumed to be caused by the mental condition and,
in fact, tends to reinforce the conclusion that the person is mentally
ill.is1
Another shortcut to a finding of incompetency in many jurisdictions
is provided by evidence that the person is hospitalized.182 In some states
such evidence leads to a conclusive presumption of incompetency,
while others regard it as rebuttable."" This merger of hospitalization
and competency determinations is open to criticism in view of re-
cent trends in psychiatric treatment which indicate that a person
may frequently be discharged after a short period of intensive
therapy 184 Even where there is no merger it is dangerous to attach
much evidentiary value to hospitalization, because commitment pro-
ceedings often lack basic procedural safeguards or do not decide the
same Issues as competency proceedings, or the hospitalization may have
taken place either pursuant to medical certification or with the con-
sent of the alleged incompetent.8 5
The Uniform Probate Code186 eliunates many of the problems
caused by vague or overreaching statutory criteria. The term "guar-
dian" is restricted to guardianship of the person.1' 7 A guardian may be
appointed by a court to care for an "incapacitated person," defined as
any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic
180. Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship: Have the Elderly
Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676, 680-81 (1964).
181. Id. at 681.
182. ABF, supra note 8, at 220; R. ALLEN, E. FFasTER, & H. WEHOFEN, MENTAL
IMpAiRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 89 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ALLEN].
183. ABF, supra note 8, at 224.
184. Id. at 223; Cobean, The New Kansas Philosophy About "Care or Treatment"
of the "Mentally Ill Person" and Obtaining a Guardian or Conservator or Both, 6
WASHmURN L.J. 448 (1967).
185. ABF, supra note 8, at 225.
186. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMIssIoNERs ON UNIFoRM STATE LAws, UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE (1969) [hereinafter cited as UPC]. See also LEGAL REsEARCH AND SERV-
ICES FOR TE ELDERLY & NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SENIOR CITIZENS, LEGISLATiVE APPROACHES
TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY: A HANDBOOK OF MODEL STATE STATUTES 119 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. For a criticism of the 1946 Model Probate Code,
Part IV, dealing with guardianship, see Fratcher, Toward Uniform Guardianship Legis-
lation, 64 MiCH. L. R~v. 983 (1966).
187. UPC § 5-101(5).
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use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except mi-
nority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or commumcate responsible decisions concerning
his person.1 8
The comment to this section states that "[a] finding that a person is
incapacitated does not amount to a finding that he is mentally ill or
can be comnutted." i89
Similar criteria are recommended for establishing conservatorships
and obtaining protective orders for the management of the disabled
person's property 190 The court may take such action if it determines
that:
(i) the person is unable to manage his property and affairs effec-
tively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physi-
cal illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic
intoxication, confinement, detention by a foreign power, or disap-
pearance; and (ii) the person has property which will be wasted
or dissipated unless proper management is provided, or that funds
are needed for the support, care and welfare of the person or
those entitled to be supported by him and that protection is neces-
sary or desirable to obtain or provide funds. 9"
By including non-mental causes among the reasons for meffective
management of property, the UPC criteria not only make the assist-
ance of a guardianship available to a wider group of disabled persons
but also de-emphasize the mental incompetency aspect of guardianship.
It is also useful to specify the meaning of mismanagement In terms of
waste or non-support, but one might hope that waste and dissipation
had been more narrowly defined.
The Proceedings
Informality is the hallmark of incompetency proceedings. Any in-
terested person may initiate them, but only eight states require that a
certificate of incompetent mental condition accompany the petition 9 2
188. UPC § 5-101(1).
189. UPC § 5-304 (Commssioners' Comment). See also Alexander, supra note 175,
at 149.
190. UPC § 5-401 to -431. See Fingar, Conservatorship under Uniform Probate Code,
4 RPAL PRoPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 433 (1969).
191. UPC S 5-401(2).
192. ABF, supra note 8, at 223.
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While notice of the forthcoming proceeding must be sent to the person
or close relatives in most states, some jurisdictions permt the judge to
reduce the statutory period for notice or dispense with it altogether,
and some waive it where the person is hospitalized. 193 At the hearing,
the presence of the person may not be required if the court so orders, 94
and in practice the person is seldom actually present, either by choice,
suggestion, or ignorance. 95
Half of the states provide for representation by counsel, but it is
generally not mandatory 116 In practice, the alleged incompetent fre-
quently lacks the assistance of counsel. Where private counsel is ap-
pointed, the smallness of the fee tends to produce representation of the
most perfunctory nature.197
A jury trial is not constitutionally mandated, but 21 states require
or at least permit the person to request one.198 Failure to do so, how-
ever, may amount to a waiver, a result which seems unduly harsh when
the person may never have received notice of his rights to the jury
trial nor have been advised by counsel. Jury trials rarely occur in those
states that do not mandate them. 99
Reform of these proceedings should move along fundamental lines.
Notice of the proceedings should be sent to the person and his close
relatives00 sufficiently well in advance to permit adequate prepara-
tion.20 ' Representation by counsel should be mandatory, either at the
choice of the person or by appointment of the court.202 To assure that
the court will be thoroughly informed of the reasons and circumstances
surrounding the proposed guardianship, investigative resources must be
available to the court to provide impartial information about the health
of the alleged incompetent, his attitude toward the proposed guardian
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Au sN, supra note 182, at 83-84.
196. ABF, supra note 8, at 223.
197. Hearings on the Legal Problems Affecting Older Americans Before the Special
Conmn. on Aging of the United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Special Comm. on Aging]; A.EN, supra note 182, at 82, 87-88; BLENXNFR,
supra note 169, at 38; Johnson, supra note 79, at 572.
198. ABF, supra note 8, at 224.
199. A.L, supra note 182, at 84.
200. See UPC § 5-309'(a) (1)-(3).
201. UPC § 1-401 (a) (1) requires at'least 14 days advance notice.
202. See UPC § 5-303 (b).
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or the person seelang appointment as guardian, and the proposed resi-
dence for the incompetent. Counsel for the incompetent could be
charged by statute with the duty of supplying such information, al-
though the expense to the incapacitated person might be prohibitive,
especially where his estate will also be paying for the cost of the peti-
tion for the guardianship. A state might avoid this problem by adopting
the approach of the Uniform Probate Code, wich requires a pre-
hearing examination by a court-appointed physician and an mvestiga-
tion by a "visitor," an agent of the court trained in law, nursing, or
social work with no personal interest in the proceedings.208
The Guardian
The finding of incompetency by a court leaves the disabled person
virtually incapable of performing an act with legal consequences. 214
He will be limited in his ability to execute documents, initiate litiga-
tion, participate in business and professional activities, and exercise
political rights and privileges. His eligibility for governmental asss-
ance, such as veterans' benefits, may also be regulated.
The court may also appoint a guardian for the incompetent's person,
estate, or both.2 5 In theory, the guardian of the person is authorized
to act as the legal representative of the ward.2 6 He may sue and be
sued on behalf of the ward, decide where the ward resides, and void
contracts of the ward entered into before the guardianship began. The
guardian of the estate, sometimes called a conservator, is charged with
the duty of prudently managing the ward's property to prevent waste
and provide for the ward's needs.2 7 He assumes possession, use, and
control of the ward's property, although title remains in the ward's
name. He usually must render a periodic accounting to the court,2 8
and must obtain court permission for certain activities, particularly
those affecting the disposition of real property209
203. UPC § 5-303 (b), -308.
204. ABF, supra note 8, at 263. The stigma of incompetency and the loss of civil
rights may lead to further debilitation of an already marginally functiomng person.
G. HALT, OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO PRoTEcrrvE SERVICES FOR =rn AGED 36 (1968).
205. ABF, supra noteS, at 263.
206. Alexander, supra note 175, at 138.
207. Id. at 139.
208. Review of the accounting is lax in some jurisdictions. AzI.EN, supra note 182,
at 92-93.
209. ABF, supra note 8, at 225.
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Proposed Reforms
Many features of guardianship are in need of revision:
1. Confusion about the purposes and functions of the guardian of
the estate and the person must be eliminated. Many statutes are vague
about guardianslup of the person and often describe its scope of au-
thority in terms that are more appropriate for the guardian of the
estate, and in practice the two are frequently indistinguishable. One
study could find no instance in which only a guardian of the person
was appomted.21
2. The all-or-nothing character of the control over the ward given
to the guardian is too sweeping. The guardian assumes total control
over virtually every area of decision-making in the personal and busi-
ness life of the ward. This approach may have validity where the ward
is patently incapable of managing hmself or his affairs, but it is poorly
suited to the gradual changes in capacity which occur between the
full vigor of middle life and the stage we call second childhood. Many
elderly people whose disability is only partial may need assistance only
with certain functions of life, such as paying bills, or with certain
transactions, such as selling a house, buying an annuity, or entering a
nursing home. Their need is for a flexible form of guardianship tailored
to their individual capacity which allows them to retain control over
those decisions which they are capable of making.211
3 The cost of guardianship is very high and may rapidly deplete
the estate or put the service beyond the reach of a person whose re-
sources are limited or consist only of a monthly benefit check.212 In
states with high charges a disabled person with a $5000 estate might
be left at the end of a five-year guardianship with only a little more
than half of the original fund, the rest having been expended on admin-
istrative charges.213 These charges, particularly where small estates
are involved, are the result of complex procedures which paradoxically
have the ostensible goal of protecting the property of the disabled per-
son. Often it is impossible to avoid such protection even if it is not
really needed. Where the aged person has only limited resources, the
210. ALLEN, supra note 182, at 95.
211. Lehmann, supra note 177, at 312.
212. NAONAL COUNCIL ON AGING, supra note 172, at 197
213. ABA Comm. on Problems Relating to Persons under Disability, Conservatorship:
Present Practice and Uniform Probate Code Compared, 5 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
& TRTas J. 507, 517 (1970).
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hlgh cost of guardianship may tempt his relatives to spend his remain-
ing assets to make him eligible for OAA assistance and a state-appointed
guardian who nught then institutionalize the ward.214 Alternatively,
the elderly person may live in a nursing home where a zealous ad-
ministrator may assume fiscal management without regard for legal
procedure. 215
4. Although the hearing is apparently non-adversarial, a conflict of
interests may lie ludden behind the mask of concern for the welfare of
the alleged incompetent and his property 216 Close relatives, expectant
heirs, and state hospitals, acting as interested parties, may petition for
appointment as guardian to prevent dissipation of the assets. This laud-
able goal may in fact benefit the family and heirs more than the ward.
Support for the hypothesis that the surrogate management of the aged
incompetent is conducted in the specific interest of some person other
than the ward has been found in a field study of the management of
such esates. 17 The study concluded that "except for young veterans,
if the specific interests of the incompetent were protected, it was out
of inadvertence and not design."
5 The prospective ward usually has no voice in the selection of his
guardian, nor does he have the opportunity to indicate in advance any
policies which he desires the guardian to follow in managing his
affairs.218
Other Forms of Protective Ser'ice
Several other types of substitute decision-making procedures will be
examined as possible models for revising the office of guardian or as
alternatives to a guardianship.
Public Guardianship
The public guardianship is an increasingly popular form of pro-
tective service. Several states have already enacted various forms of
public guardianship,219 and the Handbook of Model State Laws re-
214. HALT, supra note 204, at 36.
215. id.
216. Note, supra note 180, at 684.
217. Spectal Comm. on Aging, supra note 197, at 106-08; Alexander, supra note 175,
at 165-68.
218. AUL.N, supra note 182, at 90.
219. See text accompanying notes 221-29, 238 infra.
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cently published by Legal Research and Services for the Elderly con-
tams a proposal for the creation of this office.22°
Califorma has the most extensive system of public guardians.221 An
official, who functions at the county level, is authorized to apply for a
court appointment as guardian or conservator of the person, the estate,
or both of anyone committed to county mental health facilities, persons
receiving public aid, or anyone in the county requiring such assistance
and for whom no one is qualified and willing to provide such help.222
This official may also be appointed by the court to serve after regular
guardiansip proceedings have been initiated. His powers and duties
are generally the same as those of private guardians or conservators.
He is entitled to costs and a fee if a private guardian or conservator is
appointed to succeed him,223 or at the death of his ward he may file
a claim against the ward's estate for reimbursement of his expenses.2 2 4
More limited forms of guardianship exist in Kentucky and North
Carolina. Kentucky originally authorized the Department of Mental
Health to serve as guardian only for committed incompetents who had
no comnuttee,22 15 but in 1970 it extended the service to handle the per-
sonal funds of persons who were hospitalized but not adjudged men-
tally incompetent, 226 and it authorized regional community mental
health centers to perform these functions as well.22 7 The effect is to
permit the release from state hospitals and placement in a nursing home
or boardinghouse of many patients who might otherwise continue to
be confined because they had no one to help them. The public guardian
receives public assistance payments for his wards, makes payments to
the home operators or to the patients themselves, and accounts to the
court as required by law-all free of charge to the patient.228 All fees
for the services are to be paid out of the estate. The North Carolina
public guardian is an official appointed by the clerk of the superior
court who intervenes either six months after discovery of property of
220. HANDBoox, supra note 186, at 153.
221. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 8000 (1971).
222. CAL. WELT. & INST'NS CODE § 8006 (1971).
223. CAL. WELF. & INsT'ss CoDE § 8006.5 (1971)
224. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 8012 (1971).
225. Ky. REv. STAT. § 210.290(2) (1970).
226. Ky. REv. STAT. § 210.290(7) (1970).
227. Ch. 210(1), § 4 [1970] Ky Acts c. 278.




a "miser, idiot, lunatic, insane person or inebriate" who lacks a guard-
ian or when requested to do so by a private guardian.3 9
The Handbook statute is designed to provide free or low cost guard-
ian or conservator services for those who have no friends or relatives
within the jurisdiction able and willing to perform this service and for
those whose resources are inadequate to provide the requisite compen-
sation to a private guardian or conservator.2 0 The public guardian
would be appointed by the court which has jurisdiction over guardian-
ship hearings as an official of that court.23 ' He would serve at a fixed
rate of compensation and would be authorized to employ necessary
staff.2 2 He could petition to have himself appointed guardian or con-
servator,2' be nominated for this position by the individual in anticipa-
ton of incapacity, 2 4 or be appointed by the court even though the
individual has nominated someone else.25
The powers of this public official would be nearly identical with
those of a private guardian or conservator,2 6 and, by contrast, sub-
stantially broader than those currently given to public guardians by
most states which have similar systems. The administrative appoint-
ment costs would be paid out of public funds, but the court could
order reimbursement from the individual's income or estate to the de-
gree the funds could support such payment.23 7
The office of public conservator proposed by the Council of Elders
of Roxbury, Massachusetts differs somewhat from the Handbook
model.23 8 This official is concerned only with the property, and not
the person, of the incapacitated person. He is appointed by the gover-
nor, not the court, for a five-year period as one of five or six such
officials who would function in each county He may petition the
court for appointment only when no spouse, heirs, or friends living in
the state are capable of properly caring for the property of the mdi-
vidual. A spouse claiming the right to be conservator and satisfying
the court of suitability may successfully challenge the petition. The
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-47(1) (1966).
230. HANIooK, supra note 186, at 153.
231. Id. [Public Guardian § 2(a)].
232. Id. [Public Guardian § 1 (d)].
233. Id. [Guardianship and Conservatorship § § 5-503 (a), -404(b)].
234. Id. [Guardianship and Conservatorship §§ 5-311(b) (1), (2); -410(a) (2), (3)].
235, Id. [Guardianship and Conservatorship §§ 5-311(d), -410(c)].
236. Id. [Public Guardian § 2 (a)].
237. Id. [Public Guardian § 4].
238. Special Comm. on Agzng, supra note 197, at 93.
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legislation makes no provision for prior nomination of the public con-
servator by the person, nor does it indicate whether the court may
make the appointment on its own initiative in a proceeding brought
by another party
Substitute Payees
Several government agencies are authorized by law to appoint sub-
stitute payees for recipients of funds dispersed by those agencies. 23
The general practice is that once the agency learns of the beneficiary's
suspected incompetence, 240 payments are suspended until a determina-
tion of the competency issue is made by an agency official or board.24'
If the beneficiary is found to be incompetent,2 42 the agency tries to
select as substitute payee a person who is genuinely concerned for the
well-bemg of the beneficiary and willing to serve, make accountings,
and inform the agency of other significant events in the life of the
beneficiary243 Such person need not be a relative of the incompetent.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j) (1970) (Social Security Administration); 38 U.S.C.
§ 3202-03 (1970) (Veterans Administration); 37 U.S.C. § 601-04 (1970) (Department
of Defense); 45 U.S.C. § 228s (1970) (Railroad Retirement Board); 5 U.S.C. § 8345 (e)
(1970) (Civil Service). For a general discussion of the policies of these agencies, see
PRESIDENT's COUNCIL ON AGING, FEDERAL PAYMENTS TO OLDER PERSONS IN NEE OF
PROTECTION (1965) [hereinafter cited as PRzsIDENT's COUNCIL ON AGING]. For an
example of state legislation in this area, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 3-5a (Smith-Hurd
1968).
240. The need for appointment of the substitute payee may come to the agency's
attention through the hospitalization of the beneficiary, information provided by a
friend or relative, or, in the case of a veteran, the filing of a claim for disability
benefits. Most of the agencies do not feel obliged to take the initiative in questioning
the competence of a beneficiary. This policy has come under fire for its lack of
aggressiveness, particularly m the light of the success the Veterans Administration has
had m early identification of such persons. PRESIDENT'S CoUNcIL ON AGING, supra note
239, at 8-9, 18, 54; ALLEN, supra note 182, at 116-17, 132. It is estimated that 80,000
persons are m need of representative payment but do not have it. PRESiDENT's COUNCIL
ON AGING, supra note 239, at 54.
241. PREsIDENT's CouNcu. ON AGING, supra note 239, at 9. The Social Security Ad-
ministration, m a recent change of policy, now requires payments to continue until a
determination is made. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1601 (1970).
242. Various tests of capacity are used by these agencies. The Social Security
Administration asks whether "the interest of the beneficiary .. would be served .. re-
gardless of legal competency or incompetency " 20 C.F.R. § 404.1601 (1971). The
Veterans Administration defines an incompetent as "one who because of injury or
disease lacks the mental capacity to contract or to manage his own affairs." 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.353(a) (1971). The Railroad Retirement Board considers an individual incompe-
tent "if his condition is such that he is unable to handle his affairs." 20 C.F.R.
§ 266.5(a), (1971).
243. President's Council on Aging, supra note 239, at 55-56. The Veterans Administra-
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Supervision and review of the substitute payee's use of the funds differs
widely 2 44 The periodic accounting required is not governed by the
same standards of accountability applied to court-appointed guardians,
and problems arise involving over-conservation of the funds despite
the beneficiary's unmet needs. 245
Power of Attorney
Another legal device for assistng the elderly is the extended or
durable power of attorney The type proposed in the Uniform Pro-
bate Code is a model of simplicity 246 The power can be created by
the disability of the principal, or if previously undertaken, it continues
in spite of the principal's disability The Model Special Power of At-
torney for Small Property Interests Act prepared by the Uniform Law
Comnssioners247 differs from the UPC in that it requires approval
of the power of attorney by a judge of a court of record2ss and pro-
poses standards of liability for the attorney in fact.249 The attorney is
required to account only as specified in the power, as directed by the
judge of the approving court, or upon termination of his power or
authority, since more frequent accounting was thought only to add
unnecessary expense.2 0
Uniform Probate Code
Article V of the Uniform Probate Code contains the most sweeping
reforms of guardiansup yet proposed. The basic scheme of the UPC
separates rules for the protection of the person from those for the
non prefers a hospital payee where the veteran is hospitalized, but there is no conflict
of interest here since veterans in VA hospitals receive free hospitalization. The Social
Security Administration believes it has broad authority to bypass the legal guardian
and to appoint a different substitute payee, but the legal basis for this opinion is
questionable. In practice, the agency favors guardians, spouses, and relatives over
institutional fiduciaries. Aut.x, supra note 182, at 121-22, 135.
244. AwxN, supra note 182, at 124, 138.
245. Id. at 123, 128; Prestdent's Council on Agmg, supra note 239, at 57 The
Veterans Administration was empowered to inform the court whenever the ad-
minstrator believed that a guardian was not properly executing his trust. 38 U.S.C.
§ 3202(b) (1969). For a criticism of this practice, see Fratcher, Powers and Duties
of Guardians of Property, 45 IowA L. REv. 264, 330 (1960).
246. UPC § 5-501.
247. HANinoor, supra note 186, at 157 (Model Special Power of Attorney for Small
Property Interests Act).
248. Id. § 1 (a).
249. Id. § 7
250. Id. § 9.
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protection of his property, and calls the appointees "guardians" and
"conservators," respectively The guardian, as part of his general cus-
tody of the disabled person, has the power to establish the ward's place
of abode, either within or without the state,251 the power to give con-
sent for the ward's medical or other professional care, counsel, treat-
ment, or service,252 and the power to receive funds for the support and
care of the ward.258 The guardian also has the duty to provide for the
care, comfort, and maintenance of the ward, to take reasonable care
of the ward's personal effects, 254 and to report the condition of the
ward.255 He is entitled to reasonable sums for his services and for
room and board furnished the ward, subject to the approval of the
court or the conservator.256
The conservator's concern, on the other hand, is exclusively prop-
erty management. The court confers on him the broad powers of a
trustee257 and requires that he adhere to the same standard of prudence
and care "that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the
property of another ," 258 which is a standard considerably higher
than is now imposed on conservators by the laws of most jurisdic-
tions.259
Another innovative feature of the Uniform Probate Code is the
alternatives it provides to full conservatorship. The court, which is
given all the powers the individual would have if he were of full ca-
pacity, 260 may, in its own discretion, give only certain of these powers
to the conservator.261  The court may also authorize a single trans-
action "necessary or desirable to achieve any security, service, or care
251. UPC § 5-312(a) (1).
252. UPC § 5-312(a) (3).
253. UPC § 5-312(e) (4) (ii).
254. UPC § 5-312 (a) (2).
255. UPC § 5-312 (a) (5).
256. UPC §§ 5-312(a) (4) (ii), (b). The Handbook recommends that a provision be
included explicitly denying to the guardian the power to commit the ward to a mental
institution without the involuntary commitment proceeding prescribed by law HAM-
BOOK, supra note 186 [Guardianship and Conservatorship § 5-312 (a) (1).
257. UPC § 5-420.
258. UPC § 7-302.
259. ABA Comm. on Problems Relating to Persons under Disability, supra note 213,
at 513 n.32. Twenty-six jurisdictions had established the office of conservator as of
January 1, 1970, although m some of these states the conservator is also the guardian
of the person. McKinney, Session Law News of New York, A-52 n.1 (March 10,
1971); Alexander, supra note 175, at 139.
260. UPC § 5-408.
261. UPC § 5-426.
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arrangement meeting the foreseeable needs of the protected person." 2 2
Such protective arrangements might include a real property transaction,
purchase of a single premium annuity, or entry into a contract for life
care. This single transaction procedure is intended to avoid the prob-
lem present law often creates in requiring a guardianship simply to
make possible a valid transfer of land or securities. 23
Recommendattons
In addition to the proposals already made for reforming the critena
and procedure used in guardianship proceedings,26 4 revisions in all
aspects of protective services are also needed.
1. Guardianslup of the person and the estate should be separated.
The statutory powers and dutes of each office, particularly of the
former, as well as their inter-relationship, should be specified.
2. Limited guardianship of the estate should be permitted. Statutes
should authorize the appointment of guardians of the estate to per-
form certain tasks or categories of tasks for the ward according to
his needs.as determined by the court with the assistance, where pos-
sible, of the ward.
3. One or more low cost systems of guardianship should be estab-
lished for persons of limited means. The public guardiansup is the
most promising possibility 265 It should be available to persons whose
income and assets fall below a certain dollar level, but this level should
be substantially higher than the poverty level used for eligibility for
public assistance programs. A provision for reimbursement of the pub-
lic guardian from the remaining estate after the death of the ward
would assure that the ward's assets would be used for his benefit during
his lifetime.
The substitute payee system should be continued because of its low
cost,26  but with some reform in its procedures. Benefits should not be
suspended while the competency issue is pending,267 and representation
262. UPC § 5-409 (a).
263. UPC § 5-409 (Commissioners' Comment).
264. See text accompanying notes 209-218 supra.
265. The cost of conservatorship proceedings will generally not be reduced by
the Uniform Probate Code. ABA Comm. on Problems Relating to Persons, under
Disability, supra note 213, at 513.
266. ALLEN, supra note 182, at 128. See also Arnold, Preparing for a New Kind of
Rainy Day: Planning for Aging, 42 N.Y. ST. B.J. 603, 607 (1970).
267. Suspension of such benefits, which are statutory entitlements, without a hearing
19,721
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of the beneficiary by counsel should be made mandatory Even with
such reforms the system is of limited usefulness because it can deal
only with benefit funds and not with other assets of the beneficiary 268
The system should therefore be integrated into other comparable state
or court-approved guardianship arrangements, especially where the
state has a public guardian.
4. One method of eliminating a conflict of interests between guard-
ian and ward is to identify by statute the legitimate interests of others
in the person's property and permit a direct action by the party in
interest against the estate, thereby eliminating him from consideration
for appointment as guardian. 29  This approach has merit where the
interest is clearly identifiable, as, for example, the costs of care at a
mental hospital. But other interests, such as those of a potential heir,
are less tangible and subject to modification until the ward's death,
and therefore not readily the subject of direct action before his death.
Another way of minimizing conflict is to eliminate the preference
of the law for near relatives as guardians by the alternative method of
obtaining professional managers where available.2 0 Relatives still wish-
ing to serve as guardians might be required to renounce a future
interest in the ward's estate. While this proposal may be of value for
large estates which can afford the costs of professional management,
it provides little help for the ward of limited means whose care rests,
for better or worse, in the hands of those closest to him. Only where
a public guardianship is available would the proposal have widespread
practicality The requirement that a willing relative renounce his in-
terest in the estate appears unduly harsh and might be better left to the
discretion of the court.
To permit the ward to select his guardian in advance of incapacity
would go a long way toward softening a conflict of mterests.Y1 At
least whatever conflict is present would be of the ward's own choosing.
5 The decisions to appoint a guardian and delegate certain powers
to him should continue to be made by the court which ordinarily
deals with guardianship. There seems to be little advantage in estab-
is hard to justify on due process grounds in the light of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), at least where the beneficiary needs the payments for the necessities of life.
268. LYfrEs, supra note 170, at 43.
269. Alexander, supra note 175, at 167-68.
270. Id.




lishing a separate agency for these particular purposes. It should be
noted, however, that this is a separate question from that of establish-
Ing a social agency to provide a wide range of social services to elderly
persons.
Protective Setvices m a Socal Work Context
A system of protective services for the aged broader in scope than
the legal procedures described above has been developed over the past
decade by social workers. These services include "financial assistance,
medical evaluation, psychiatric consultation, legal consultation, fiduci-
ary and guardianslup service, home aide and other home help services,
nursing consultation and evaluation, and placement in a protective set-
ting." 272 Such a system of services has three functions: the preventive,
the supportive, and the surrogate.2 3 The last, the heart of these serv-
ices, involves the ability to act on behalf of the older person, with or
without his consent, and therefore includes legal authority or the po-
tential for such authorization.2 7 4
The social agency is the key element in these protective services,
since it provides the casework, continuity, and financial resources
needed for such an undertaking.275 Two professional problems, one
organizational and the other ethical, still trouble these agencies with
regard to such services. At the organizational level debate continues
about the merits of establishing protective services for the aged within
an existing social agency or of handling them through a new, special-
ized, independent agency The former approach allows the protective
services program to capitalize on the agency's lines of communication
with other community resources, but the agency will necessarily be
required to adapt its policies and regulations to the new program and
the agency's reputation, for better or worse, will affect the program.276
272. BLENXNER, supra note 169, at 16. See also AMERICAN PuBuc WELFME Assocu-
TioN, Tim GUIDE FOR IN-SERVICE TRAINING FOR DEVELOPING SERvicEs FOR OLDER PERSONS
27-29 (1970); J. BuRR, PROTECtiVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PERSONS (1964); NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF LAWYERS AND SOCIAL WoRKERS, ADULT PRoTEcTvE SERVICES: RESPONSIILITIES
AND RECMPROCAL RELATIONSHmPS OF ThE LAWYER AND SOCIAL WORKER (1967); Cummmg,
Growing Problems in Protective Services for the Aged, 21 GERIATRICS 163 (1966).
273. HAL, supra note 204, at 5.
274. Note 173 supra. See also Bennett, Protective Services for the Aged, 39 Soc.
Scr. REv. 283 (1965); Ross, Protective Services for the Aged, 8 GERONroLoGisr 50
(Part H 1968).
275. HALL, supra note 204, at 6-7 See also NATIONAL COUNCIL ON AGING, supra note
172, at 198-99.
276. LYNis, supra note 170, at 40-41.
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Formation of a new agency would probably permit the new policies
and structure needed for protective services to develop more quickly,
but the level of efficiency and service might be lower during the early
stages of the program. It has also been suggested that such an agency
be set up within the local department of public welfare or in a com-
munity mental health center and that it be given quasi-judicial powers
to appoint, supervise, and terminate fiduciaryships for those it serves. 2 7
The ethical problem confronting the social agency is similar to the
one courts face: when should the agency remove from the client his
basic right of self-determination? 278 Does the elderly person have the
right to be left exploited or neglected, to starve himself to death, or to
die prematurely of an acute illness if he chooses?2 79 Does the fact that
the caseworker, neighbors, relatives, or community agencies find the
person's way of living intolerable or unbearably risky mean that the
aged person must change his lifestyle? Whose needs are really served
by legal intervention? 280
To date, five experimental protective services projects have been
attempted. One of these was adminmistered by the Benjamin Ross Insti-
tute of Cleveland, Ohio.21 The project accepted 164 elderly persons,
referred to it by various social agencies, who fitted within the definition
of one requiring protective services. All of the participants were inter-
viewed four times during one year, but the 76 persons in the demon-
stration service group were provided with a full range of protective
services as described above28 2 while the other 88 in the control group
were given standard service by the referring agency Among the
criteria established in advance for evaluating the success of the project
was one which required two events to occur in combination: "a) more
of the service participants than controls had to survive and b) among
the survivors, the service participants had to be more contented." 28
The results indicated that the project service was not effective in
277. H. WEHOFEN, LEGAL SERVICES AND COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS 43
(1969). See also Turner, The Public. Agency as the Social Guardianm of Aged Persons,
in 1964 PROcEEDINGS, PENNSYLVANIA CONFERENCE ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER
PEoPLE 24 (1964).
278. LYNEs, supra note 170, at 19.
279. HALL, supra note 204, at 32.
280. E. Wasser, Casework as the Core of Protective Services 226 (paper presented
at a workshop on Protective Services for Older Adults, Portland, Oregon, Nov. 1967).
281. BLENENER, supra note 169.
282. See text accompanying notes 251-59 supra.
283. BLENKNER, supra note 169, at 72.
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preventing death or in slowing down deterioration in physical func-
tiomug,284 the two major reasons frequently given for intervening in
a protective case. The service participant, in fact, showed a less favor-
able survival rate than the control group.2 5 Apparently the cause of
the higher mortality rate in the service group was the tendency to in-
stitutionalize this group that developed as a result of the caseworkers'
greater concern for the welfare of the participants.2 6 Institutionaliza-
ton shortened the lives of the persons committed. It was noted, how-
ever, that contentment in that segment of the group which was not
institutionalized proved higher than for the control group. Thus, it
appears that a protective service program might be successful if it
can resist the temptation toward commtment of the participants.
The evaluation of the other four demonstration projects also pro-
vided some interesting conclusions. 2 7 The researchers found that
clients who might otherwise continue to exert at least some self-
determination were frequently robbed of that right by overuse of con-
servatorships and guardianshups. They also noted that the agency
tended to view the client's problems as irreversible and therefore always
needing these services. The studies suggested that the clients should be
assisted with the goal of helping themselves reach a point where they
would no longer need to be clients.288 Another note of caution in the
use of legal intervention by the social agency lies in the proposal that
more research is needed in seeking out, reconnecting to society, and
identifying the needs of the isolated elderly through long-term follow-
up home visits before full protective service programs are started.28 9
A more optinmstic note is struck by the Group for the Advance-
merdt of Psychiatry, which considers the pilot programs to have been
"most successful." 2 90 The group proposes federal funding of a Pro-
tective Service Corps of trained para-professional workers to service
the elderly regardless of income, organized in outreach units with legal,
medical, and psychiatric consultants attached to them. In a similar vein,
284. Id. at 73.
285. Id. at 69.
286. M. Blenlmer, Service and Survival 11 (paper presented at Eighth International
Congress of Gerontology, Washington, D. C., Aug. 26, 1969) (revised Sept. 12, 1969).
287. L-NEs, supra note 170, at 20.
288. Id. at 21.
289.. R. -Bennett, Discussion of G. Mathuasen's paper on Protective Services for the
Aged -(presented. at N.Y. State Welfare Association meeting, Syracuse, N. Y, Nov. 20,
1969).
290. GROUP FOR T ADvANcEMENT or PSYCHATRY, REoRT No. 79, supra note 117,
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the Special Assistant to the President for Aging envisions a protective
services umt of skilled professionals, including, where possible, a phy-
sician, a psychiatrist, and a lawyer, who would conduct diagnostic and
evaluative review of the client's situation, make referrals for service to
other agencies, initiate actions for appointment of guardians, and main-
tam follow-up review of its clients.291 He also proposes that retired
persons be trained to serve as paraprofessional conservators.
It seems clear that the goals of helping the elderly avoid comnt-
ment to a mental hospital or maintain independent living arrangements
will not be achieved merely by revising the law of civil commitment
and guardianship or supplying new types of decision-making pro-
cedures for the elderly A variety of supportive services, institutional
and non-institutional, which can be described only in general terms
here, must accompany the legal reform.
At the present time institutional arrangements for long-term care of
the elderly are limited in function, capacity, and availability Homes
for the aged, for example, typically care only for those who present no
special medical or psychiatric difficulties and can afford their fees.
Medicare provisions for extended care facilities and Medicaid support
for nursing homes were not intended to deal with the problem of long-
term care.212 A coordinated program of additional beds and expanded
and strengthened medical, psychiatnc, and social services in nursing
homes and health-related facilities is needed.
For those aged who are not institutionalized, a limited program of
social services is presently available. Title III of the Older Americans
Act authorizes a number of such services, including telephone re-
assurance calls, friendly visitation services, homemaker or home mainte-
nance service, and meals services.298 The delivery of these services to
the elderly, however, still leaves large gaps because of the lack of
systematic planning and correlation between the public and private
sectors.29 4 There is also a critical shortage of trained personnel, in-
cluding social service workers, homemakers, home health aides, and
counselors. Federal funding for these programs is precarious, and if
it were withdrawn, many states would terminate them.
291. LYNEs, supra note 170, at 12.
292. SPEcIAL ComM. oN AGING oF THE UNrrrE STATES SENATE, DEVELOPMrNts IN
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293. 42 US.C. §§ 3021-25,-(1970).
294. DEVELOPMENTS xw AGING 1970, supra note 292, at 125-26.
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PROTECTIVE SERVICES
The possible range of ancillary services in the commumty is well
described in the Report of Task Force to Plan Alternatives to State
Hospital Admissions of Aging of New York City"5 The document
calls for:
1. A program of preventive and maintenance health services includ-
ing annual medical-social-psychiatric evaluations of elderly persons, and
neighborhood-based medical care centers geared to the needs of the
geriatric patient.
2. Services in the home setting, including increased housekeeping,
homemaker-home health aide, friendly visitor, and communications
services, as well as the establishment of reaching-out programs to find
and service the aged who are homebound or living in hotels or specific
geographic areas where there are known large concentrations of older
people.
3. Supportive community services, including day and night care
centers in hospitals or homes for the aging, counselling and referral
services established as part of recreational agencies, ambulatory care
centers, and public housing, and escort and transportation services to
bring patients to the medical care center, where necessary
4. Additional low-income housing for the elderly 296
One may hope that the White House Conference on Aging has pro-
vided the impetus needed to design a sound and coordinated approach
for the organization and delivery of these services for the aged, and to
muster the political support necessary to establish and pay for this
program.2 97 The legal reforms suggested in this article, however, are
valuable in themselves and can be implemented on their own merits.
CONCLUSION
The policies underlying the above analysis are simply stated: that the
aged person should continue to enjoy the greatest amount of freedom
consistent with his physical and mental abilities, that the legal system
should permit hum to be deprived of his independence only to the ex-
tent necessary to prevent a substantial danger of serious harm to himself
or others, and that government should provide care, treatment, and
295. NEw YoRK CITY OFFICE FOR THE AGING & CITIZENS' COMMITrEE FOR THE AGING,
REPORT oF TASK FORCE TO PLAN ALTERNATIVES TO STATE HoSPITAL ADMISSIONS OF AGING
(1971).
296. Id. at 9-16.
297. DEvELOPrmNTs IN AGING 1970, supra note 292, at 88.
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supportive services designed to prolong or restore functional inde-
pendence.
The deeper philosoplucal problem presented by the emergence of
a large elderly population has yet to be faced by modern society The
number of aged persons will certainly rise, but it is not at all certain
that the value a youth-oriented culture places on its elderly citizens will
similarly appreciate. The aged no longer have strong ties to the nuclear
family They no longer produce in a society that prizes and rewards
productivity Their role is vague and superfluous. These low-value
factors make it easy to relegate the interests of the elderly to the bot-
tom of society's list of priorities, to bury them in institutions, or to
hand them over to managers. Whatever skepticism one may have about
the willingness of society to change its values concerning the elderly,
the law should at least allow society to make an honest choice in its
care for the aged by eliminating the oppression latent in many of the
present systems of commitment and guardianship.
